BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

　　波克夏海瑟崴股份有限公司

　　To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

　　致所有股东:

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Our gain in net worth during 1998 was $25.9 billion, whic

　　increased the per-share book value of both our Class A and Class B

　　stock by 48.3%. Over the last 34 years (that is, since present

　　management took over) per-share book value has grown from $19 to

　　$37,801, a rate of 24.7% compounded annually.*

　　1998年本公司的净值增加了259亿美元，每股账面净值不管是A级股或B级

　　股皆成长了48.3%，总计过去34年以来，也就是自从现有经营阶层接手之后，

　　每股净值由当初的19元成长到现在的37,801美元，年复合成长率约为

　　24.7%*。

　　* All figures used in this report apply to Berkshire's A shares, the successor to the only

　　stock that the company had outstanding before 1996. The B shares have an economic

　　interest equal to 1/30th that of the A.

　　*1在年报中所谓的每股数字系以A级普通股约当数为基础，这是本公司在1996年以前流通在

　　外唯一的一种股份，B级普通股则拥有A级普通股三十分之一的权利。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Normally, a gain of 48.3% would call for handsprings -- but no

　　this year. Remember Wagner, whose music has been described as better

　　than it sounds? Well, Berkshire's progress in 1998 -- though more than

　　satisfactory -- was not as good as it looks. That's because most of that

　　48.3% gain came from our issuing shares in acquisitions.

　　通常当公司的净值一年能够成长48.3%时，大家应该要高兴的手舞足蹈，不过

　　今年却不行，还记得德国音乐天才华格纳吗? 他的音乐曾被形容为没有想象中好

　　听，嗯! 我想Berkshire在1998年的进展，虽然已经相当令人满意了，但还是

　　没有表面上看起来那么好，主要的原因在于在增加的48.3%净值当中，有绝大

　　部份系来自于因购并交易所发行的新股。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　To explain: Our stock sells at a large premium over book value

　　which means that any issuing of shares we do -- whether for cash or as

　　consideration in a merger -- instantly increases our per-share book-

　　value figure, even though we've earned not a dime. What happens is that

　　we get more per-share book value in such transactions than we give up.

　　These transactions, however, do not deliver us any immediate gain in

　　per-share intrinsic value, because in this respect what we give and what

　　we get are roughly equal. And, as Charlie Munger, Berkshire's Vice

　　Chairman and my partner, and I can't tell you too often (though you may

　　feel that we try), it's the per-share gain in intrinsic value that counts

　　rather than the per-share gain in book value. Though Berkshire's

　　intrinsic value grew very substantially in 1998, the gain fell well short of

　　the 48.3% recorded for book value. Nevertheless, intrinsic value still far

　　exceeds book value. (For a more extensive discussion of these terms,

　　and other investment and accounting concepts, please refer to our

　　Owner's Manual, on pages 56-64, in which we set forth our owner-

　　related business principles. Intrinsic value is discussed on pages 61 and

　　62.)

　　再进一步说明，由于我们公司目前的股价远高于账面价值，这意思代表每当我们

　　发行新股，不管是现金增资或者是合并发行新股，都会立即大幅拉高我们每股的

　　账面净值，但实际上我们没有因此多赚进半毛钱，而真实的情况是，这类交易对

　　我们每股实质价值并不会产生立即的效果，主要是由于我们所得到的跟我们所付

　　出的只能算是相当，而就像我与合伙人查理孟格不厌其烦，但却一再强调的真正

　　重要的是实质的价值的增加而非账面净值的增加，虽然Berkshire 1998年的实

　　质价值大幅成长，但绝不到账面净值增加48.3%的那种幅度，不过尽管如此，

　　我还是必须强调，目前的实质价值仍远高于账面净值，(有关这些名词的说明，

　　请大家参阅股东手册，在里头我们揭示了与股东相关的经营原则)。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　We entered 1999 with the best collection of businesses an

　　managers in our history. The two companies we acquired in 1998,

　　General Re and Executive Jet, are first-class in every way -- more about

　　both later -- and the performance of our operating businesses last year

　　exceeded my hopes. GEICO, once again, simply shot the lights out. On

　　the minus side, several of the public companies in which we have major

　　investments experienced significant operating shortfalls that neither

　　they nor I anticipated early in the year. Consequently, our equity

　　portfolio did not perform nearly as well as did the S&P 500. The

　　problems of these companies are almost certainly temporary, and

　　Charlie and I believe that their long-term prospects are excellent.

　　展望1999年，我们拥有有史以来最佳企业与经理人的黄金组合，我们在1998

　　年买下的两家公司，分别是通用再保与Executive Jet在各方面的条件皆是一时

　　之选(后面还会详加说明)，而原有拥有的企业表现更是超乎我个人的预期，

　　GEICO保险再一次令人瞠目结舌，当然也有不好的消息，几家我们拥有大笔投

　　资的大型上市公司经营纷传缺失，这也是当初我们没有预期到的，也因此使得我

　　们股票投资组合的绩效表现低于同期S&P 500指数，还好这些公司所发生的问

　　题都只是暂时的，查理跟我都相信他们长期发展的远景还是相当的乐观。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　In our last three annual reports, we furnished you a tablehat we

　　regard as central to estimating Berkshire's intrinsic value. In the

　　updated version of that table, which follows, we trace our two key

　　components of value, including General Re on a pro-forma basis as if

　　we had owned it throughout the year. The first column lists our per-

　　share ownership of investments (including cash and equivalents but

　　excluding securities held in our financial products operation) and the

　　second column shows our per-share earnings from Berkshire's

　　operating businesses before taxes and purchase-accounting

　　adjustments (discussed on pages 62 and 63), but after all interest and

　　corporate expenses. The second column excludes all dividends, interest

　　and capital gains that we realized from the investments presented in the

　　first column. In effect, the columns show how Berkshire would look if it

　　were split into two parts, with one entity holding our investments and

　　the other operating all of our businesses and bearing all corporate

　　costs.

　　在最近三年的年报中，我们提供了我们认为可以最能够估计Berkshire实质价值

　　的一张表，在今年刚刚更新数据的表中，我们以拟制的方式将通用再保的数字加

　　入其中，也就是假设该公司自年度一开始就为我们所拥有，第一栏的数字代表我

　　们拥有每股的投资金额(包括现金与约当现金，但扣除财务金融单位持有的证

　　券)，第二栏则是每股在扣除利息与营业费用之后，Berkshire来自本业的营业利

　　益(但未扣除所得税与购买法会计调整数)，当然后者已经扣除了所有来自第一栏

　　投资所贡献的股利收入、利息收入与资本利得，事实上，从这张表可以看出若是

　　把Berkshire分拆成两部份的话会变成怎样，其结果就等于是一家持有我们投资

　　部位的控股公司，以及另一家经营旗下所有事业负担全部成本盈亏的营利事业。

　　Investments

　　Per Share

　　Pre-tax Earnings Per Share

　　With All Income from

　　Investments Excluded

　　Year

　　1968

　　..................

　　$ 53

　　$ 2.87

　　1978

　　......

　　465

　　12.85

　　1988

　　.....

　　4,876

　　145.77

　　1998

　　.

　　47,647

　　474.45

　　Here are the growth rates of the two segments by decade:

　　Investments Per Share

　　Pre-tax Earnings Per Share With All Income from Investments Excluded

　　Decade Ending

　　1978

　　......

　　24.2%

　　16.2%

　　1988

　　......

　　26.5%

　　27.5%

　　1998

　　......

　　25.6%

　　12.5%

　　Annual Growth Rate, 1968-1998 ...................

　　25.4%

　　18.6%

　　　 　 　 　 　 　During 1998, our investments increased by $9,604 per share, o

　　25.2%, but per-share operating earnings fell by 33.9%. General Re

　　(included, as noted, on a pro-forma basis) explains both facts. This

　　company has very large investments, and these greatly increased our

　　per-share investment figure. But General Re also had an underwriting

　　loss in 1998, and that hurt operating earnings. Had we not acquired

　　General Re, per-share operating earnings would have shown a modest

　　gain.

　　回顾1998年，我们每股的投资金额增加了9,604美元，约25.2%，不过每股

　　营业盈余却减少33.9%，主要的原因缘自于通用再保(如先前所说，在今年以拟

　　制的方式并入Berkshire)，这家公司拥有相当大的投资部位，这使得我们每股的

　　投资金额大幅增加，不过另一方面，该公司在1998年也产生承保损失，这又拖

　　累了我们的每股营业盈余表现，事实上，要是我们没有买下通用再保，我们当年

　　的每股营业盈余可能还能维持小幅增加。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Though certain of our acquisitionand operating strategies may

　　from time to time affect one column more than the other, we continually

　　work to increase the figures in both. But one thing is certain: Our future

　　rates of gain will fall far short of those achieved in the past. Berkshire's

　　capital base is now simply too large to allow us to earn truly outsized

　　returns. If you believe otherwise, you should consider a career in sales

　　but avoid one in mathematics (bearing in mind that there are really only

　　three kinds of people in the world: those who can count and those who

　　can't).

　　虽然某些特定的购并案与经营策略会影响到其中某一栏数字，但我们还是尽量让

　　两栏数字能够均衡发展，不过有一点可以确定的是，我们未来的成长率将远不及

　　过去所创造的水准，Berkshire现在的规模实在是大到我们很难再做出任何重大

　　的突破，若是你不这样认为，你应该去从事业务员的工作，而不是去教数学(请

　　永远记住，世界上只有三种人，一种会算术，另一种不会算术)。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Currently we are woing to compound a net worth of $57.4

　　billion, the largest of any American corporation (though our figure will

　　be eclipsed if the merger of Exxon and Mobil takes place). Of course,

　　our lead in net worth does not mean that Berkshire outranks all other

　　businesses in value: Market value is what counts for owners and General

　　Electric and Microsoft, for example, have valuations more than three

　　times Berkshire's. Net worth, though, measures the capital that

　　managers must deploy, and at Berkshire that figure has indeed become

　　huge.

　　净值代表着一家公司经理人可以运用的资金，就这方面而言，Berkshire的规模

　　无疑是相当可观的，现在我们可以掌控的净值高达574亿美元，这数字居所有

　　美国公司之冠，(虽然如果艾克森和Mobil石油合并案成功的话，我们必须让出

　　宝座)，当然这并不代表Berkshire实际的价值，对于股东来说，公司总市值才

　　是最重要的，就这点而言，通用电气与微软的市值就是Berkshire的三倍以上。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Nonetheless, Charlie a I will do our best to increase intrinsic

　　value in the future at an average rate of 15%, a result we consider to be

　　at the very peak of possible outcomes. We may have years when we

　　exceed 15%, but we will most certainly have other years when we fall far

　　short of that -- including years showing negative returns -- and those

　　will bring our average down. In the meantime, you should understand

　　just what an average gain of 15% over the next five years implies: It

　　means we will need to increase net worth by $58 billion. Earning this

　　daunting 15% will require us to come up with big ideas: Popcorn stands

　　just won't do. Today's markets are not friendly to our search for

　　"elephants," but you can be sure that we will stay focused on the hunt.

　　不过说归说，查理跟我还是希望能够尽力让公司的价值在未来以每年15%的平

　　均速度成长，这是我们认为可能达到的极限，在往后的日子，有时我们可能可以

　　超过15%，但也很有可能远不如这个标准，甚至可能会变成负的，而使得我们

　　平均成长率往下拉，另外大家要知道，所谓每年平均15%的成长率代表在往后

　　的五年之内，我们的净值必须要成长580亿美元，如果没有几个轰轰烈烈的大

　　案子的话，是绝对不可能办的到的，像爆米花摊这种小玩意可不行，而现在的市

　　场环境也不利于我们寻找合适的大象猎物，不过我们可以向大家保证一定会全神

　　贯注。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Whever the future holds, I make you one promise: I'll keep at

　　least 99% of my net worth in Berkshire for as long as I am around. How

　　long will that be? My model is the loyal Democrat in Fort Wayne who

　　asked to be buried in Chicago so that he could stay active in the party.

　　To that end, I've already selected a "power spot" at the office for my urn.

　　不管未来会如何，有一点我可以向各位保证的是，只要我还在，我都会将我个人

　　99%以上的身家摆在Berkshire，至于能够维持多久? 我则是希望能够效法Fort

　　Wayne忠诚的民主党员，临终时还表示希望死后能够葬在芝加哥，好就近参加

　　党的活动，所以我也在办公室事先选好的一个好位置，以后可以用来摆我的骨灰

　　坛。

　　* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Our financial growth has been matched by employment growth

　　We now have 47,566 on our payroll, with the acquisitions of 1998

　　bringing 7,074 employees to us and internal growth adding another

　　2,500. To balance this gain of 9,500 in hands-on employees, we have

　　enlarged the staff at world headquarters from 12 to 12.8. (The .8

　　doesn't refer to me or Charlie: We have a new person in accounting,

　　working four days a week.) Despite this alarming trend toward

　　corporate bloat, our after-tax overhead last year was about $3.5

　　million, or well under one basis point (.01 of 1%) of the value of the

　　assets we manage.

　　随着经济实力的增长，我们雇用员工的人数也同步增加，我们现在拥有47,566

　　位员工，其中包含1998年购并通用再保后并进来的7,074人，以及内部增聘

　　的2,500人，而未了服务新增加的9,500个人手，我们的总部人员也从原来的

　　12人扩编为12.8人(0.8指的不是查理或是我本人，而是我们新请的一位会计

　　人员，一个礼拜工作四天)，尽管这是组织浮滥的警讯，但是我们去年税后总部

　　开支却只有区区350万美元，大概占我们管理总资产的一个基本点(万分之一)

　　还不到。

　　Taxes

　　租税

　　　 　 　 　 　 　One beneficiary of our increased size has been the U.S. Treasury

　　The federal income taxes that Berkshire and General Re have paid, or

　　will soon pay, in respect to 1998 earnings total $2.7 billion. That means

　　we shouldered all of the U.S. Government's expenses for more than a

　　half-day.

　　我们规模扩大最直接的受惠者之一就是美国国库，今年光是Berkshire与通用再

　　保已经支付或即将支付的联邦所得税就有27亿美元之谱，这笔钱足够供美国政

　　府支应半天以上的开销。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Follow that thought a little further: If only 625 other U.S

　　taxpayers had paid the Treasury as much as we and General Re did last

　　year, no one else -- neither corporations nor 270 million citizens --

　　would have had to pay federal income taxes or any other kind of federal

　　tax (for example, social security or estate taxes). Our shareholders can

　　truly say that they "gave at the office."

　　也就是说，全美国只要有625个像Berkshire及通用再保这样的纳税人的话，

　　其它所有的美国公司或二亿七千万的美国公民都可以不必再支付任何的联邦所

　　得税或其它任何形式的联邦税(包含社会福利或房地产税)，所以Berkshire的股

　　东可以说是"功在国家"。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Writing checks to the IRS that include strings of zeros does no

　　bother Charlie or me. Berkshire as a corporation, and we as individuals,

　　have prospered in America as we would have in no other country.

　　Indeed, if we lived in some other part of the world and completely

　　escaped taxes, I'm sure we would be worse off financially (and in many

　　other ways as well). Overall, we feel extraordinarily lucky to have been

　　dealt a hand in life that enables us to write large checks to the

　　government rather than one requiring the government to regularly write

　　checks to us -- say, because we are disabled or unemployed.

　　对于查理跟我来说，签发后面有一长串"零"的大额支票一点都不会感到困扰，

　　Berkshire身为一家美国企业，以及我们身为美国公民，得以在美国这个伟大的

　　国家繁荣发展，这是在其它国家所不可能达到的，我想要是我们生在世界上的别

　　的角落，那么就算是我们再怎么努力的逃避税负，我们也不可能像现在这么富有

　　(也包含生活上其它层面)，从另一个角度来说，我们感到很幸运能够支付一大笔

　　钱给政府，而非因为我们残障或失业，要靠政府三不五时来救济我们。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Berkshire's tax situation isometimes misunderstood. First,

　　capital gains have no special attraction for us: A corporation pays a 35%

　　rate on taxable income, whether it comes from capital gains or from

　　ordinary operations. This means that Berkshire's tax on a long-term

　　capital gain is fully 75% higher than what an individual would pay on an

　　identical gain.

　　Berkshire的租税负担常常引起外界的误解，首先资本利得对我们并不太有利，

　　企业不论是资本利得或是其它正常的营利都必须支付35%的所得税，这也就是

　　说面对相同的长期资本利得，Berkshire的租税负担要比一般个人要高出75%

　　以上。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Some people harbor another misconception, believing that w

　　can exclude 70% of all dividends we receive from our taxable income.

　　Indeed, the 70% rate applies to most corporations and also applies to

　　Berkshire in cases where we hold stocks in non-insurance subsidiaries.

　　However, almost all of our equity investments are owned by our

　　insurance companies, and in that case the exclusion is 59.5%. That still

　　means a dollar of dividends is considerably more valuable to us than a

　　dollar of ordinary income, but not to the degree often assumed.

　　另外有些人还抱有一个不正确的观念，以为我们可以将70%以上的股利收入列

　　为免税收入，事实上这种适用于大部分美国企业的优惠，仅适用于Berkshire旗

　　下非保险事业所持有的股票，可惜我们大部分的股份都是由保险事业所持有，这

　　部份的免税比例就只有59.5%，当然这仍然代表每一块钱的股利收入比起其它

　　一般的应税收入来得有价值。

　　* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Berkshire truly went all out for the Treasury last year.

　　connection with the General Re merger, we wrote a $30 million check to

　　the government to pay an SEC fee tied to the new shares created by the

　　deal. We understand that this payment set an SEC record. Charlie and I

　　are enormous admirers of what the Commission has accomplished for

　　American investors. We would rather, however, have found another way

　　to show our admiration.

　　Berkshire去年真的是卯起来贡献国库，像是去年的通用再保合并案，我们就付

　　了3,000万美元给美国证管会作为发行新股的手续费，这金额创下了证管会有

　　史以来的新纪录，查理跟我对于证管会为所有投资人所做的努力感到崇敬，只是

　　如果能用其它方法来表示敬意就更好了。

　　GEICO (1-800-847-7536)

　　GEICO保险

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Combine a great idea with a great manager and you're certain t

　　obtain a great result. That mix is alive and well at GEICO. The idea is

　　low-cost auto insurance, made possible by direct-to-customer

　　marketing, and the manager is Tony Nicely. Quite simply, there is no

　　one in the business world who could run GEICO better than Tony does.

　　His instincts are unerring, his energy is boundless, and his execution is

　　flawless. While maintaining underwriting discipline, Tony is building an

　　organization that is gaining market share at an accelerating rate.

　　好的理念加上好的经理人，最后一定可以获得好的成果，这样的完美组合在

　　GEICO身上获得最佳的印证，透过直效行销大幅降低成本的汽车保险搭配像

　　Tony Nicely这样优秀的经理人，很显然的全世界再没有其它人可以像Tony可

　　以把GEICO经营的这样好，他的直觉毫无偏差、他的能量没有上限，而他的行

　　动完美无暇，在严守承保纪律的同时，Tony所带领的团队正以超高的速度攻占

　　市场占有率。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　This pace has been encouraged by our compensation picies.

　　The direct writing of insurance -- that is, without there being an agent

　　or broker between the insurer and its policyholder -- involves a

　　substantial front-end investment. First-year business is therefore

　　unprofitable in a major way. At GEICO, we do not wish this cost to deter

　　our associates from the aggressive pursuit of new business -- which, as

　　it renews, will deliver significant profits -- so we leave it out of our

　　compensation formulas. What's included then? We base 50% of our

　　associates' bonuses and profit sharing on the earnings of our

　　"seasoned" book, meaning policies that have been with us for more than

　　a year. The other 50% is tied to growth in policyholders -- and here we

　　have stepped on the gas.

　　这样的速度更因为受到我们特殊的奖励计划激励而加快，通常保单直接销售-也

　　就是不透过代理或中介，直接由保险公司与客户接洽的业务，需要一笔相当大的

　　前置投资，也因此第一年刚接到的保单通常都没有什么利润，不过要是客户在接

　　下来年度能够继续续约的话，公司将享有极高的获利，在GEICO我们为了不希

　　望公司的同仁因而降低争取新业务的企图心，所以我们特别将第一年的数字排除

　　在关乎员工奖金与分红的奖金计算公式之外，其中有50%是基于每季的帐上获

　　利-代表投保期间超过一年以上的保单，另外的50%则是视公司保单数量的成长

　　情况，这也是我们正加紧油门全力冲刺的。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　I1995, the year prior to its acquisition by Berkshire, GEICO

　　spent $33 million on marketing and had 652 telephone counselors. Last

　　year the company spent $143 million, and the counselor count grew to

　　2,162. The effects that these efforts had at the company are shown by

　　the new business and in-force figures below:

　　1995年当Berkshire还没有完全买下GEICO时，该公司每年的行销预算是

　　3,300万美元，并有652位电话咨询员，到了去年，公司的行销预算增加为1.43

　　亿美元，电话咨询员的人数也增加至2,162位，这些努力所得到的成果可以从

　　下表该公司新接保单与有效保单数字中看出端倪。

　　New Auto

　　Auto Policies

　　Years

　　Policies*

　　In-Force*

　　1993

　　354,882

　　2,011,055

　　1994

　　396,217

　　2,147,549

　　1995

　　461,608

　　2,310,037

　　1996

　　617,669

　　2,543,699

　　1997

　　913,176

　　2,949,439

　　1998

　　1,317,761

　　3,562,644

　　* "Voluntary" only; excludes assigned risks and the like.

　　　 　 　 　 　 　In 1999, we will again increase our marketing budget, spendin

　　at least $190 million. In fact, there is no limit to what Berkshire is willing

　　to invest in GEICO's new-business activity, as long as we can

　　concurrently build the infrastructure the company needs to properly

　　serve its policyholders.

　　展望1999年我们将继续增加行销预算到至少1.9亿美元，事实上Berkshire

　　对于GEICO在新业务取得上的投资是没有上限的，只要我们可以帮公司建立起

　　能够客户更好服务的各种措施。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Because of the first-year costs, companies that are concerne

　　about quarterly or annual earnings would shy from similar investments,

　　no matter how intelligent these might be in terms of building long-term

　　value. Our calculus is different: We simply measure whether we are

　　creating more than a dollar of value per dollar spent -- and if that

　　calculation is favorable, the more dollars we spend the happier I am.

　　而也由于第一年的成本负担，许多关心短期利益的公司都吝啬于从事相同的投

　　资，不管这些动作对公司长期的利益而言，是如何的有助益，但是我们的盘算就

　　不一样了，我们只是很简单的去评量现在所投入的每一块钱在未来是否能产生高

　　于一块钱的效益，如果估算出来确实有利，那么就算是花再多的钱我也开心。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　There is far more to GEICO's success, of course, than low price

　　and a torrent of advertising. The handling of claims must also be fair,

　　fast and friendly -- and ours is. Here's an impartial scorecard on how we

　　shape up: In New York, our largest-volume state, the Insurance

　　Department recently reported that GEICO's complaint ratio in 1997 was

　　not only the lowest of the five largest auto insurers but was also less

　　than half the average of the other four.

　　当然GEICO成功的原因决不仅于低价与强势的行销，申诉的处理也要合理、快

　　速、亲切，这里有一个客观的数据可说明这点，在业务量居我们首位的纽约地区，

　　保险主管机关最近公布GEICO在1997年前五大汽车保险公司当中，其申诉比

　　率是最低的，其比例甚至远低于其它四家同业平均数的一半。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　GEICO's 1998 profit margin of 6.7% was better than we ha

　　anticipated -- and, indeed, better than we wished. Our results reflect an

　　industry-wide phenomenon: In recent years, both the frequency of auto

　　accidents and their severity have unexpectedly declined. We responded

　　by reducing rates 3.3% in 1998, and we will reduce them still more in

　　1999. These moves will soon bring profit margins down -- at the least

　　to 4%, which is our target, and perhaps considerably lower. Whatever

　　the case, we believe that our margins will continue to be much better

　　than those of the industry.

　　GEICO 1998年的获利率达到6.7%，超过我们当初的预期，事实上是远高于我

　　们所能想象的程度，我们的成绩反映出产业间普遍存在的一种现象，近几年来，

　　汽车意外发生的频率与程度都比以往减轻许多，也因此我们立刻反应调降3.3%

　　的费率，预计在1999年还会降得更多，虽然这个举动马上使得我们的获利率下

　　降，但我们的目标至少是4%或甚至更低，不过不论如何，我们相信GEICO的获

　　利率还是远比同业的数字来得好的许多。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　With GEICO's growth and profitability both outanding in 1998,

　　so also were its profit-sharing and bonus payments. Indeed, the

　　profit-sharing payment of $103 million or 32.3% of salary -- which

　　went to all 9,313 associates who had been with us for more than a year

　　-- may well have been the highest percentage payment at any large

　　company in the country. (In addition, associates benefit from a

　　company-funded pension plan.)

　　由于GEICO 1998年优异的绩效与获利能力，该公司的分红数字亦跟着水涨船

　　高，总计1.03亿美元，约占薪资的32.3%，由公司全体年资超过一年以上的

　　9,313位同仁共同来分享，这个数字在全美所有公司当中比例可以说是最高的，

　　(此外同仁还可经由公司提拨的退休金持股计划间接受惠)。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The 32.3% may turn out to be a high-water mark, given that th

　　profitability component in our profit-sharing calculation is almost

　　certain to come down in the future. The growth component, though,

　　may well increase. Overall, we expect the two benchmarks together to

　　dictate very significant profit-sharing payments for decades to come.

　　For our associates, growth pays off in other ways as well: Last year we

　　promoted 4,612 people.

　　虽然公司分红计划中的成长因子应该还会继续维持，但考量到获利因子在未来几

　　乎可以肯定会逐渐下降，所以32.3%的比例可以说是破天荒的新高，当然我们

　　预期这两项因子在未来的十年内仍然会是分红计划中扮演极为重要的角色，不过

　　对于我们的同仁来说，成长还代表着另一个意义，去年总计有4,612位同仁获

　　得升迁。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Impressive as the GEICO figures are, we have far more to do. Ou

　　market share improved significantly in 1998 -- but only from 3% to 3?

　　%. For every policyholder we now have, there are another ten who should

　　be giving us their business.

　　虽然GEICO的绩效数字是如此的令人印象深刻，但是我们仍然还有相当大的成

　　长空间，没错! GEICO1998年的市场占有率确实大幅提升，但也只不过从3%

　　增加为3.5%而已，换句话说相较于我们现在服务的每一个保单客户，等于还有

　　十个在外面等待我们去给他们提供服务。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Some of you who are reading this may be in that category. Abou

　　40% of those who check our rates find that they can save money by

　　doing business with us. The proportion is not 100% because insurers

　　differ in their underwriting judgements, with some giving more credit

　　than we do to drivers who live in certain geographical areas or work at

　　certain occupations. We believe, however, that we more frequently offer

　　the low price than does any other national carrier selling insurance to all

　　comers. Furthermore, in 40 states we can offer a special discount --

　　usually 8% -- to our shareholders. So give us a call and check us out.

　　有些正在读我们年报的人很可能就属于这类的人，在每个来征询GEICO保单费

　　率的人当中，平均有40%的人会发现向我们投保能为他们省下一笔钱，而之所

　　以不是百分之百的原因在于每家保险业者对于风险的判断估计都有所不同，有些

　　保险公司对于居住于某些特定地区的居民或从事某些特定职业的客户有偏好，不

　　过我仍然坚信我们提供给一般民众的费率通常都低于其它全国性的业者，在随年

　　报附赠的GEICO资料中，大家将可以看到我们提供给来自全美40州股东最高

　　8%的折扣费率，所以记得打电话给我们试一试。

　　* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　 　 　 　 　 　You may think that one commercial in this section is enough. Bu

　　I have another to present, this one directed at managers of publicly-

　　owned companies.

　　在这段我还有一个广告要打，这广告主要是要写给上市公司的经理人看的。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　At Berkshire we feel that telling outanding CEOs, such as Tony,

　　how to run their companies would be the height of foolishness. Most of

　　our managers wouldn't work for us if they got a lot of backseat driving.

　　(Generally, they don't have to work for anyone, since 75% or so are

　　independently wealthy.) Besides, they are the Mark McGwires of the

　　business world and need no advice from us as to how to hold the bat or

　　when to swing.

　　在Berkshire我们一直认为要教像Tony这样杰出的经理人如何经营公司是一件

　　相当愚蠢的事，事实上要是我们一直在背后指指点点的话，大部份的经理人可能

　　早就干不下去了，(坦白说他们大多根本就可以不必要再靠工作过活，75%以上

　　的人都已经相当有钱)，他们可以说是商场上的强打麦奎尔，根本就不需要我们

　　去指导他如何拿棒子或何时挥棒。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Nevertheless, Berkshire's ownership may make even the best o

　　managers more effective. First, we eliminate all of the ritualistic and

　　nonproductive activities that normally go with the job of CEO. Our

　　managers are totally in charge of their personal schedules. Second, we

　　give each a simple mission: Just run your business as if: 1) you own

　　100% of it; 2) it is the only asset in the world that you and your family

　　have or will ever have; and 3) you can't sell or merge it for at least a

　　century. As a corollary, we tell them they should not let any of their

　　decisions be affected even slightly by accounting considerations. We

　　want our managers to think about what counts, not how it will be

　　counted.

　　但是由Berkshire掌控企业所有权，却能够让这些经理人有更好的发挥，首先我

　　们去除掉所有一般总裁必须面对所有的繁文缛节与没有生产力的活动，我们的经

　　理人可以全心全意的安排自己个人的行程，第二，我们给予相当明确简单的任务

　　指示，那就是一、像自己拥有公司一样的心态来经营，二、把它当作是你跟你家

　　人在全世界仅有的资产来看待，第三、在有生之年内，你没办法将它卖掉或是让

　　别人给并走，我们告诉他们完全不要被会计账面方面的考量来影响到其实际经营

　　上的决策，我们希望经理人了解什么才是最关键紧要的事。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Very few CEOs of public companies operate under a simila

　　mandate, mainly because they have owners who focus on short-term

　　prospects and reported earnings. Berkshire, however, has a shareholder

　　base -- which it will have for decades to come -- that has the longest

　　investment horizon to be found in the public-company universe.

　　Indeed, a majority of our shares are held by investors who expect to die

　　still holding them. We can therefore ask our CEOs to manage for

　　maximum long-term value, rather than for next quarter's earnings. We

　　certainly don't ignore the current results of our businesses -- in most

　　cases, they are of great importance -- but we never want them to be

　　achieved at the expense of our building ever-greater competitive

　　strengths.

　　很少有上市公司的经理人可以如此自在的经营公司，这是因为大部分公司背后的

　　股东往往只着重短期的利益，相较之下，Berkshire背后有几十年来一直相当稳

　　定的股东群，拥有其它上市公司少见的长期投资眼光，事实上，这些股东打算一

　　直持有Berkshire至死方休，也因此旗下的经理人可以用一辈子的时间来经营公

　　司，而不用为了下一季的获利情况来烦恼，当然这绝不代表我们就不关心公司经

　　营的现况，事实上，这点也相当的重要，只是我们不希望只因为一昧追求短期的

　　获利而被迫牺牲掉公司长远发展的竞争优势。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　I believe the GEICO story demonstrates the benefits of Berkshire'

　　approach. Charlie and I haven't taught Tony a thing -- and never will -

　　- but we have created an environment that allows him to apply all of his

　　talents to what's important. He does not have to devote his time or

　　energy to board meetings, press interviews, presentations by

　　investment bankers or talks with financial analysts. Furthermore, he

　　need never spend a moment thinking about financing, credit ratings or

　　"Street" expectations for earnings per share. Because of our ownership

　　structure, he also knows that this operational framework will endure for

　　decades to come. In this environment of freedom, both Tony and his

　　company can convert their almost limitless potential into matching

　　achievements.

　　我想GEICO成功的经验再再显示出Berkshire经营模式的优越性，查理跟我从

　　来就没有指示Tony该怎么做事，我想以后也不会，我们的工作就是提供他一个

　　绝佳的环境，让他能够彻底发挥才能去做该做的事，他不需要把时间耗费在无意

　　义的董事会、记者会或分析师与投资银行业者的简报上，此外他也不必担心公司

　　的资金问题、信用评等或坊间对于公司获利的预期，而更因为我们特殊的股权结

　　构，他更了解这样的营运模式至少可以继续维持长达数十年以上，在这样自由的

　　环境之下，Tony跟他所带领的团队就可以将百分百的心思花在应付外在多变的

　　环境。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　If you are running a large, profitable business that will thrive in

　　GEICO-like environment, check our acquisition criteria on page 21 and

　　give me a call. I promise a fast answer and will mention your inquiry to

　　no one except Charlie.

　　所以如果你同样也在管理一家获利稳定的大型企业，并且向往在像GEICO一样

　　的经营环境下大展鸿图的话，建议你先看看我们报告后段的购并标准，然后打个

　　电话给我，我保证一定会很快可以回复，而且除了查理之外，我不会把这件事告

　　诉其它任何人。

　　Executive Jet Aviation (1-800-848-6436)

　　企业主管飞行计划

　　　 　 　 　 　 　To understand the huge potential at Executive Jet Aviation (EJA)

　　you need some understanding of its business, which is selling fractional

　　shares of jets and operating the fleet for its many owners. Rich Santulli,

　　CEO of EJA, created the fractional ownership industry in 1986, by

　　visualizing an important new way of using planes. Then he combined

　　guts and talent to turn his idea into a major business.

　　想要了解企业主管飞行计划(EJA)的无限潜力，你必须要先了解这个产业的特

　　性，它专门出售专机部份所有权给客户并且帮所有权人维护保养机队，EJA的总

　　裁-Rich Stantulli预视到飞机使用的革命新方法，于是在1986年发挥其个人

　　绝佳的胆识与才能让其创意成真，开创了专机部份所有权这个新兴行业。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　In a fractional ownership plan, you purchase a portion -- sa

　　1/8th -- of any of a wide variety of jets that EJA offers. That purchase

　　entitles you to 100 hours of flying time annually. ("Dead-head" hours

　　don't count against your allotment, and you are also allowed to average

　　your hours over five years.) In addition, you pay both a monthly

　　management fee and a fee for hours actually flown.

　　按照部份所有权计划，你可以买下，由EJA提供各种系列的飞机，比如说八分之

　　一的部份所有权，如此你便可获得该架飞机每年100个小时的飞行时数，(不包

　　含飞机停机的时间，而且你还有权利将这些时数自由分配到五年内)，不过每个

　　月你还必须支付一些管理费以及真正搭乘时的钟点费。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Then, on a few hours notice, EJA makes your plane, or another a

　　least as good, available to you at your choice of the 5500 airports in the

　　U.S. In effect, calling up your plane is like phoning for a taxi.

　　然后，你只要在几个小时前通知我们，EJA就可以在全美指定的5,500座机场

　　安排好飞机，换言之，这种便利性跟你打电话叫出租车一样的方便。

　　　 　 　 　 　I first heard about the NetJetsR program, as it is called, about

　　four years ago from Frank Rooney, our manager at H.H. Brown. Frank

　　had used and been delighted with the service and suggested that I meet

　　Rich to investigate signing up for my family's use. It took Rich about 15

　　minutes to sell me a quarter (200 hours annually) of a Hawker 1000.

　　Since then, my family has learned firsthand -- through flying 900 hours

　　on 300 trips -- what a friendly, efficient, and safe operation EJA runs.

　　Quite simply, they love this service. In fact, they quickly grew so

　　enthusiastic that I did a testimonial ad for EJA long before I knew there

　　was any possibility of our purchasing the business. I did, however, ask

　　Rich to give me a call if he ever got interested in selling. Luckily, he

　　phoned me last May, and we quickly made a $725 million deal, paying

　　equal amounts of cash and stock.

　　我是在四年前头一次知道它的存在，当时它叫做Netjets计划，经由我们旗下

　　H.H. Brown鞋业的经理人Frank Roony的介绍，Frank本身就常利用该公司

　　所提供的服务，而且觉得相当满意，于是他建议我可以和Rich碰个面研究看看

　　是否可以让我的家族加入，结果Rich前后只花了15分钟的时间就说服我买下

　　四分之一的(也就是每年200小时)的霍克1000型飞机的所有权，从此之后，我

　　的家族在经过900个飞行小时，300次旅程的亲身体验之后，渐渐了解这种服

　　务为客人所带来的亲切、方便与安全性，毫无疑问地就爱上它，而我本人也在家

　　族成员热心的督促下，为该公司的服务在广告中做了见证，而事实上，在当时我

　　还没有想到有可能能够买下这家公司，不过我还是跟Rich提到，如果他有意愿

　　记得随时打电话给我，而幸运的是，Rich真的在去年五月份打电话给我，我们

　　很快就达成这笔7.25亿美元的交易，其中现金与股票各半。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　EJA, which is by far the largest operator in its industry, has mor

　　than 1,000 customers and 163 aircraft (including 23 "core" aircraft that

　　are owned or leased by EJA itself, so that it can make sure that service is

　　first-class even during the times when demand is heaviest). Safety, of

　　course, is the paramount issue in any flight operation, and Rich's pilots

　　-- now numbering about 650 -- receive extensive training at least twice

　　a year from FlightSafety International, another Berkshire subsidiary and

　　the world leader in pilot training. The bottom line on our pilots: I've sold

　　the Berkshire plane and will now do all of my business flying, as well as

　　my personal flying, with NetJets' crews.

　　EJA目前已是这个产业规模最大的业者，拥有超过1,000位的客户以及163架

　　的飞机，(其中包含23架由EJA本身拥有或出租的核心飞机，用来确保在订位

　　需求最强劲时还能保持最高品质的服务)，安全性当然是任何飞行单位最重要的

　　考量，而Rich旗下650位的飞行驾驶每年都要到国际飞安公司(另一家由我们

　　转投资全世界最大的飞行员训练公司)接受至少两次广泛的训练课程，对我来说

　　我能做的都做了，我已经把Berkshire原来的专机给卖掉，并把我的事业与家庭

　　连同Netjets的同僚一起飞上天际。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Being the leader in this industry is a major advantage for al

　　concerned. Our customers gain because we have an armada of planes

　　positioned throughout the country at all times, a blanketing that allows

　　us to provide unmatched service. Meanwhile, we gain from the

　　blanketing because it reduces dead-head costs. Another compelling

　　attraction for our clients is that we offer products from Boeing,

　　Gulfstream, Falcon, Cessna, and Raytheon, whereas our two

　　competitors are owned by manufacturers that offer only their own

　　planes. In effect, NetJets is like a physician who can recommend

　　whatever medicine best fits the needs of each patient; our competitors,

　　in contrast, are producers of a "house" brand that they must prescribe

　　for one and all.

　　在这个产业成为领导品牌是最重要的一件事，我们的客户因为我们遍布全美各地

　　的机队而受惠，因为我们可以提供别家公司比不上的服务，所以我们也可大幅降

　　低飞机停在地面的时间，另一个令客户无法抵挡的致命吸引力是我们提供了各式

　　各样的飞机，从波音、湾流、Falcon、Cessna到雷神，相较之下我们其它两个

　　由飞机制造商经营的竞争对手就只能提供自家生产的飞机，事实上，Netjets就

　　好像是一位医生一样，可以为个别的病人量身订做，依其所需提供不同的配方，

　　不像另外两家业者，都是千篇一律的开出家传的狗皮膏药。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　In many cases our clients, both corporate and individual, ow

　　fractions of several different planes and can therefore match specific

　　planes to specific missions. For example, a client might own 1/16th of

　　three different jets (each giving it 50 hours of flying time), which in total

　　give it a virtual fleet, obtained for a small fraction of the cost of a single

　　plane.

　　实际上我们有许多客户，包含企业与一般个人，同时拥有不同种类的飞机部份所

　　有权，以应付不同场合所需不同的机型，举列来说，一个客户可以拥有三种飞机

　　各16分之一的所有权(也就是每年各50小时的飞行时数)，这等于只要花一笔

　　为数不多的钱，就拥有一群机队一般。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Significantly, it is not only small businesses that can benefit fro

　　fractional ownership. Already, some of America's largest companies use

　　NetJets as a supplement to their own fleet. This saves them big money in

　　both meeting peak requirements and in flying missions that would

　　require their wholly-owned planes to log a disproportionate amount of

　　dead-head hours.

　　更重要的是，并不是中小企业才可以利用到这种服务，目前已经有一些大企业利

　　用Netjets来补充本身机队调度的不足，这让他们可以不必因为应付尖峰时间与

　　避免必须长期间停留地面的任务而省下一大笔开支。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　When a plane is slated for personal use, the clinching argumen

　　is that either the client signs up now or his children likely will later.

　　That's an equation I explained to my wonderful Aunt Alice 40 years ago

　　when she asked me whether she could afford a fur coat. My reply settled

　　the issue: "Alice, you aren't buying it; your heirs are."

　　当一架飞机被用来当作私人使用，有一个很大的争议那就是不是由现在的客户买

　　单，就是由后辈的子孙来买单，这也是我最敬爱的阿姨Alice在40年前，问我

　　是否应该买一件貂皮大衣时，我回答她的话:"阿姨，你花的不是自己的钱，而是

　　你的继承人的"。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　EJA's growth has been explosive: In 1997, it accounted for 31% o

　　all corporate jets ordered in the world. Nonetheless, Rich and I believe

　　that the potential of fractional ownership has barely been scratched. If

　　many thousands of owners find it sensible to own 100% of a plane --

　　which must be used 350-400 hours annually if it's to make economic

　　sense -- there must be a large multiple of that number for whom

　　fractional ownership works.

　　EJA正以爆炸性的速度成长，1997年31%以上的企业专机订单是由它所下，不

　　过Rice与我都认为飞机部份所有权的潜力根本还未充分的被挖掘，如果目前有

　　成千上万的人认为值得花一整架飞机的钱(也就是每年花350-400个小时飞

　　行)，那么我们认为就应该有更多人需要拥有部份飞机的所有权。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　In addition to being a terrific executive, Rich is fun. Like most o

　　our managers, he has no economic need whatsoever to work. Rich

　　spends his time at EJA because it's his baby -- and he wants to see how

　　far he can take it. We both already know the answer, both literally and

　　figuratively: to the ends of the earth.

　　Rich除了身为一位杰出的经理人之外，本人也非常风趣幽默，就像是我们旗下

　　大多数的经理人一样，Rich根本就不需要靠工作来过活，Rich之所以愿意全心

　　全力地投入在EJA，完全因为这是他一手催生带大的孩子，他只想要看自己能够

　　做到怎样的地步，当然我们都已经知道最后的答案，不论是从文字上或是从数字

　　上皆是如此。

　　* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　 　 　 　 　 　And now a small hint to Berkshire directors: Last year I spen

　　more than nine times my salary at Borsheim's and EJA. Just think how

　　Berkshire's business would boom if you'd only spring for a raise.

　　另外给Berkshire董事会们一个小暗示，去年我光是在波仙珠宝与EJA的花费就

　　是我个人薪水收入的九倍以上，所以大家可以想象到只有给我一点小小的加薪，

　　保证会对Berkshire集团企业的生意有大大的提升。

　　General Re

　　通用再保

　　　 　 　 　 　 　On December 21, we completed our $22 billion acquisition o

　　General Re Corp. In addition to owning 100% of General Reinsurance

　　Corporation, the largest U.S. property-casualty reinsurer, the company

　　also owns (including stock it has an arrangement to buy) 82% of the

　　oldest reinsurance company in the world, Cologne Re. The two

　　companies together reinsure all lines of insurance and operate in 124

　　countries.

　　12月21号我们完成对通用再保公司220亿美金的购并案，除了拥有这家全美

　　国最大的产物险再保险公司之外，这家公司亦拥有世界上历史最悠久的再保公司

　　-科隆再保82%的股权(包含预计准备要买进的股份)，两家公司合起来将可接受

　　所有保险险种的再保险，并在全世界124个国家设有营业据点。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　For many decades, General Re's name has stood for quality

　　integrity and professionalism in reinsurance -- and under Ron

　　Ferguson's leadership, this reputation has been burnished still more.

　　Berkshire can add absolutely nothing to the skills of General Re's and

　　Cologne Re's managers. On the contrary, there is a lot that they can

　　teach us.

　　几十年来，通用再保代表的是再保业界品质、正直与专业的保证，而在Ron

　　Ferguson的领导之下，这个招牌更加获得肯定，关于通用再保的专业，

　　Berkshire实在没有太多的东西可以给他们，反倒是他们应该有很多的东西可以

　　教我们。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Nevertheless, we believe that Berkshire's ownership will benefi

　　General Re in important ways and that its earnings a decade from now

　　will materially exceed those that would have been attainable absent the

　　merger. We base this optimism on the fact that we can offer General Re's

　　management a freedom to operate in whatever manner will best allow

　　the company to exploit its strengths.

　　不过我们仍然相信Berkshire的所有权可以让通用再保在许多方面受益，而在往

　　后的十年内，通用再保的获利情况应该可以比合并之前要好的许多，而我们的自

　　信心完全建立在我们能够提供通用再保一个可以完全自由发挥的经营环境。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Let's look for a moment at the reinsurance business t

　　understand why General Re could not on its own do what it can under

　　Berkshire. Most of the demand for reinsurance comes from primary

　　insurers who want to escape the wide swings in earnings that result

　　from large and unusual losses. In effect, a reinsurer gets paid for

　　absorbing the volatility that the client insurer wants to shed.

　　让我们花一点时间来了解为何通用再保自己在再保险业没有办法像在

　　Berkshire之下那样的发挥，再保险的需求大部分来自于第一线保险公司想要规

　　避大型的意外损失所造成获利状况大幅波动的风险，事实上，再保险业者就是因

　　为吸收保险业客户想要规避的变动性而存在。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Ironically, though, a publicly-held reinsurer gets graded by bot

　　its owners and those who evaluate its credit on the smoothness of its

　　own results. Wide swings in earnings hurt both credit ratings and p/e

　　ratios, even when the business that produces such swings has an

　　expectancy of satisfactory profits over time. This market reality

　　sometimes causes a reinsurer to make costly moves, among them laying

　　off a significant portion of the business it writes (in transactions that are

　　called "retrocessions") or rejecting good business simply because it

　　threatens to bring on too much volatility.

　　讽刺的是一家上市的再保险公司必须要同时接受股东以及外界评估其获利稳定

　　的检验，因此盈余变动过大将会影响其债信评等与本益比，就算就长期而言，这

　　家公司或许可以获得更有利的平均报酬，市场的现实有时却可能导致再保公司因

　　此犯下重大的错误，包含被迫放弃原先接下的一大部分业务(业界一般称之为倒

　　退)或放弃上门的好生意，只因为要避免带来获利的不稳定性。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Berkshire, in contrast, happily accepts volatility, just as long as i

　　carries with it the expectation of increased profits over time.

　　Furthermore, we are a Fort Knox of capital, and that means volatile

　　earnings can't impair our premier credit ratings. Thus we have the

　　perfect structure for writing -- and retaining -- reinsurance in virtually

　　any amount. In fact, we've used this strength over the past decade to

　　build a powerful super-cat business.

　　不过Berkshire却很能够接受这样的不确定性，只要就长期而言，它的预期报酬

　　能够有好的表现，更重要的是，Berkshire可以说是资金的诺克斯金库，也就是

　　说任何盈余的剧烈变动一点也不会影响到我们的债信评等，也因此我们有能力也

　　有意愿签下并自留没有任何上限的再保金额，事实上，过去十年来，我们早已运

　　用这个优势建立起强大的巨灾保险业务。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　What General Re gives us, however, is the distribution force

　　technical facilities and management that will allow us to employ our

　　structural strength in every facet of the industry. In particular, General

　　Re and Cologne Re can now accelerate their push into international

　　markets, where the preponderance of industry growth will almost

　　certainly occur. As the merger proxy statement spelled out, Berkshire

　　also brings tax and investment benefits to General Re. But the most

　　compelling reason for the merger is simply that General Re's

　　outstanding management can now do what it does best, unfettered by

　　the constraints that have limited its growth.

　　而通用再保可以给我们的是行销通路、技术背景与管理技能，让我们得以将原本

　　拥有的财务优势更充分运用到保险业的每一个层面，尤其是通用再保与科隆再保

　　现在可以加速投入国际市场，这块大家看好将呈现高成长的处女地，而就像合并

　　案的公开说明书中所强调的，Berkshire将为通用再保带来租税与投资上的优

　　势，但是更重要的原因还在于通用再保的优秀经营阶层将可以在既有的基础上，

　　摆脱原有的种种束缚，尽情地发挥其潜能。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Berkshire is assuming responsibility for General Re's investmen

　　portfolio, though not for Cologne Re's. We will not, however, be involved

　　in General Re's underwriting. We will simply ask the company to

　　exercise the discipline of the past while increasing the proportion of its

　　business that is retained, expanding its product line, and widening its

　　geographical coverage -- making these moves in recognition of

　　Berkshire's financial strength and tolerance for wide swings in earnings.

　　As we've long said, we prefer a lumpy 15% return to a smooth 12%.

　　Berkshire将会承担管理通用再保投资组合的工作(但科隆再保部份不包含在

　　内)，除此之外我们并不会干涉通用再保的承保业务，我们只算很简单地要求他

　　们继续维持原有的原则，同时利用Berkshire强大的财务实力以及盈余变动的超

　　强忍受力，增加自留业务的比例、扩大现有产品线、增加业务区域，就像是我们

　　一再强调的，我们宁可接受变动剧烈的15%，也不要稳健平顺的12%。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Over time, Ron and his team will maximize General Re's ne

　　potential. He and I have known each other for many years, and each of

　　our companies has initiated significant business that it has reinsured

　　with the other. Indeed, General Re played a key role in the resuscitation

　　of GEICO from its near-death status in 1976.

　　相信只要给他们一点时间，Ron跟他的团队一定能够将通用再保的潜力发挥到

　　极致，我跟他已经结识好几年了，彼此之间也一直维持有再保业务上的往来，事

　　实上，通用再保在1976年GEICO当初东山再起的过程中，扮演极为重要的角

　　色。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Both Ron and Rich Santulli plan to be at the annual meeting, an

　　I hope you get a chance to say hello to them.

　　Ron跟Rich两人都将出席今年的股东会，希望届时大家可以过来跟他们两位打

　　声招呼。

　　The Economics of Property-Casualty Insurance

　　产物意外险的经营

　　　 　 　 　 　 　With the acquisition of General Re -- and with GEICO's busines

　　mushrooming -- it becomes more important than ever that you

　　understand how to evaluate an insurance company. The key

　　determinants are: (1) the amount of float that the business generates;

　　(2) its cost; and (3) most important of all, the long-term outlook for

　　both of these factors.

　　随着通用再保的加入以及GEICO业务的突飞猛进，大家越来越有必要对如何评

　　估保险业有更多的了解，其中主要的关键因素有(1)这个行业所能产生的浮存金

　　数量(2)以及它的成本(3)最重要的是这些因素长期的展望。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　To begin with, float is money we hold but don't own. In a

　　insurance operation, float arises because premiums are received before

　　losses are paid, an interval that sometimes extends over many years.

　　During that time, the insurer invests the money. Typically, this pleasant

　　activity carries with it a downside: The premiums that an insurer takes in

　　usually do not cover the losses and expenses it eventually must pay.

　　That leaves it running an "underwriting loss," which is the cost of float.

　　An insurance business has value if its cost of float over time is less than

　　the cost the company would otherwise incur to obtain funds. But the

　　business is a lemon if its cost of float is higher than market rates for

　　money.

　　首先浮存金是一项我们持有但却不属于我们的资金，在保险公司的营运中，浮存

　　金产生的原因在于保险公司在真正支付损失理赔之前，一般会先向保户收取保

　　费，在这期间保险公司会将资金运用在其它投资之上，当然这样的好处也必须要

　　付出代价，通常保险业者收取的保费并不足以因应最后支付出去的相关损失与费

　　用，于是保险公司便会发生承保损失，这就是浮存金的成本，而当一家公司取得

　　浮存金成本，就长期而言低于从其它管道取得资金的成本时，它就有存在的价

　　值，否则一旦保险事业取得浮存金的成本若远高于货币市场利率时，它就像是一

　　颗极酸的柠檬。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　A cautions appropriate here: Because loss costs must be

　　estimated, insurers have enormous latitude in figuring their

　　underwriting results, and that makes it very difficult for investors to

　　calculate a company's true cost of float. Errors of estimation, usually

　　innocent but sometimes not, can be huge. The consequences of these

　　miscalculations flow directly into earnings. An experienced observer

　　can usually detect large-scale errors in reserving, but the general public

　　can typically do no more than accept what's presented, and at times I

　　have been amazed by the numbers that big-name auditors have

　　implicitly blessed. As for Berkshire, Charlie and I attempt to be

　　conservative in presenting its underwriting results to you, because we

　　have found that virtually all surprises in insurance are unpleasant ones.

　　有一点必须特别注意的是，因为损失成本必须仰赖估算，所以保险业者对于承保

　　结算的成绩有相当大伸缩的空间，连带使得投资人很难正确地衡量一家保险公司

　　真正的浮存金成本，估计错误，通常是无心，但有时却是故意，与真实的结果往

　　往会有很大的差距，而这种结果直接反映在公司的损益表上，有经验的行家通常

　　可以经由公司的准备提列情形发现重大的错误，但对于一般投资大众来说，除了

　　被迫接受财务报表的数字之外，别无他法，而我个人常常被这些经过各大会计师

　　事务所背书的财务报告所吓到，至于就Berkshire本身而言，查理跟我在编列财

　　务报表时，都尽量采取最保守的做法，因为就我们个人的经验而言，保险业所发

　　生的意外，通常都不会是什么好消息。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The table that follows shows the float generated by Berkshire'

　　insurance operations since we entered the business 32 years ago. The

　　data are for every fifth year and also the last, which includes General

　　Re's huge float. For the table we have calculated our float -- which we

　　generate in large amounts relative to our premium volume -- by adding

　　net loss reserves, loss adjustment reserves, funds held under

　　reinsurance assumed and unearned premium reserves, and then

　　subtracting agents balances, prepaid acquisition costs, prepaid taxes

　　and deferred charges applicable to assumed reinsurance. (Got that?)

　　下表中所显示的数字是，Berkshire进入保险事业32年以来所贡献的浮存金，

　　资料以每五年计，而最近的五年还包含通用再保大量的浮存金在内，可说是大获

　　全胜，在这张计算浮存金的表中，我们将所有的损失准备、损失费用调整准备、

　　再保预先收取的资金与未赚取保费加总后，再扣除应付佣金、预付购并成本、预

　　付税负以及取得再保业务的相关递延费用，得出浮存金的数额，弄清楚了吗?? 相

　　对于我们的保费收入总额，我们的浮存金部位算是相当大的。

　　Year

　　Average Float

　　(in $ millions)

　　1967

　　17

　　1972

　　70

　　1977

　　139

　　1982

　　221

　　1987

　　1,267

　　1992

　　2,290

　　1997

　　7,093

　　1998

　　22,762 (yearend)

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Impressive as the growth in our float has been -- 25.4

　　compounded annually -- what really counts is the cost of this item. If

　　that becomes too high, growth in float becomes a curse rather than a

　　blessing.

　　每年25.4%的成长确实令人印象深刻，不过真正重要的是取得浮存金的成本，

　　如果成本过高，那么浮存金的成长就可能变成一项诅咒而非幸福。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　At Berkshire, the news is all good: Our average cost over the 3

　　years has been well under zero. In aggregate, we have posted a

　　substantial underwriting profit, which means that we have been paid for

　　holding a large and growing amount of money. This is the best of all

　　worlds. Indeed, though our net float is recorded on our balance sheet as

　　a liability, it has had more economic value to us than an equal amount of

　　net worth would have had. As long as we can continue to achieve an

　　underwriting profit, float will continue to outrank net worth in value.

　　在Berkshire 我们的记录算是不错的了，32年来我们的平均成本远低于零，总

　　的来说，我们享有相当多的承保利益，也就是说我们在持有一笔大额且不断成长

　　的资金的同时，还能获得额外的利益，这是全世界之最，虽然就会计原则而言，

　　浮存金在会计报表系属于负债，但实际上，这些负债对于Berkshire而言，其价

　　值远甚至高于列在帐上的其它股东权益，而只要我们在承保上能够持续维持利益

　　的话，这些浮存金的价值就远胜于帐上的净值。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　During the next few years, Berkshe's growth in float may well be

　　modest. The reinsurance market is soft, and in this business,

　　relationships change slowly. Therefore, General Re's float -- 2/3rds of

　　our total -- is unlikely to increase significantly in the near term. We do

　　expect, however, that our cost of float will remain very attractive

　　compared to that of other insurers.

　　在往后的几年内，Berkshire浮存金的成长速度可能会略微减缓，再保险的市场

　　相当低迷，在这行商业关系的变动相当缓慢，也因此占我们总浮存金将近三分之

　　二的通用再保浮存金在可见的未来很难有重大的进展，不过我们仍然预期

　　Berkshire浮存金的成本相较于其它同业能够维持相当低的水准。

　　Sources of Reported Earnings

　　帐列盈余的来源

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The table that follows shows the main sources of Berkshire'

　　reported earnings. In this presentation, purchase-accounting

　　adjustments are not assigned to the specific businesses to which they

　　apply, but are instead aggregated and shown separately. This procedure

　　lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been

　　reported had we not purchased them. For the reasons discussed on

　　pages 62 and 63, this form of presentation seems to us to be more

　　useful to investors and managers than one utilizing generally-accepted

　　accounting principles (GAAP), which require purchase-premiums to be

　　charged off business-by-business. The total earnings we show in the

　　table are, of course, identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial

　　statements.

　　下表显示Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源，在这张表中商誉的摊销数与购买法会

　　计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来，单独加总列示，之所以这样做是为了让

　　旗下各事业的盈余状况，不因我们的投资而有所影响，过去我一再地强调我们认

　　为这样的表达方式，较之一般公认会计原则要求以个别企业基础做调整，不管是

　　对投资者或是管理者来说，更有帮助，当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计

　　师查核的数字一致。

　　　 (in millions)

　　Berkshire's Share

　　of Net Earnings

　　(after taxes and

　　Pre-Tax Earnings

　　minority interests)

　　1998

　　1997

　　1998

　　1997

　　Operating Earnings:

　　Insurance Group:

　　Underwriting -- Super-Cat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　$154

　　$283

　　$100

　　$183

　　Underwriting -- Other Reinsurance . . . . . . . . . .

　　(175)

　　(155)

　　(114)

　　(100)

　　Underwriting -- GEICO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　269

　　281

　　175

　　181

　　Underwriting -- Other Primary . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　17

　　53

　　10

　　34

　　Net Investment Income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　974

　　882

　　731

　　704

　　Buffalo News . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　53

　　56

　　32

　　33

　　Finance and Financial Products Businesses . . . .

　　205

　　28

　　133

　　18

　　Flight Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　181

　　(1)

　　140

　　110

　　(1)

　　84

　　Home Furnishings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　72

　　57

　　(2)

　　41

　　32

　　(2)

　　International Dairy Queen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　58

　　--

　　35

　　--

　　Jewelry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　39

　　32

　　23

　　18

　　Scott Fetzer (excluding finance operation) . . . . .

　　137

　　119

　　85

　　77

　　See's Candies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　62

　　59

　　40

　　35

　　Shoe Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　33

　　49

　　23

　　32

　　General Re . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　26

　　(3)

　　--

　　16

　　(3)

　　--

　　Purchase-Accounting Adjustments . . . . . . . . . . .

　　(123)

　　(101)

　　(118)

　　(94)

　　Interest Expense (4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　(100)

　　(107)

　　(63)

　　(67)

　　Shareholder-Designated Contributions . . . . . . . .

　　(17)

　　(15)

　　(11)

　　(10)

　　Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　34

　　60

　　29

　　37

　　Operating Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　1,899

　　1,721

　　1,277

　　1,197

　　Capital Gains from Investments . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　2,415

　　1,106

　　1,553

　　704

　　Total Earnings - All Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

　　$4,314

　　$2,827

　　$ 2,830

　　$1,901

　　=====

　　=====

　　=====

　　=====

　　(1) Includes Executive Jet from August 7, 1998.

　　(2) Includes Star Furniture from July 1, 1997.

　　(3) From date of acquisition, December 21, 1998.

　　(4) Excludes interest expense of Finance Businesses.

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Yocan be proud of our operating managers. They almost

　　invariably deliver earnings that are at the very top of what conditions in

　　their industries allow, meanwhile fortifying their businesses' long-term

　　competitive strengths. In aggregate, they have created many billions of

　　dollars of value for you.

　　大家绝对可以我们旗下优秀的经理人为荣，他们几乎都能够在各自产业所能允许

　　的情况下创造出最好的获利，同时还能继续强化企业长期的竞争优势，总的来

　　说，他们已为所有的股东创造出数十亿美元的价值。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　An example: In my 1994 letter, I reported on Ralph Schey'

　　extraordinary performance at Scott Fetzer. Little did I realize that he was

　　just warming up. Last year Scott Fetzer, operating with no leverage

　　(except for a conservative level of debt in its finance subsidiary), earned

　　a record $96.5 million after-tax on its $112 million net worth.

　　举例来说，在1994年的年报中，我曾经向各位提到Ralph在史考特飞兹的杰

　　出表现，只是我万万没想到的是那时还只能算是他的热身阶段，去年在没有任何

　　借款的情况下(除了其财务子公司的一点借款之外)，靠着1.12亿美元的净值，

　　竟缔造出9,650万美元的惊人税后净利。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Today, Berkshire has an unusually large number of individuals

　　such as Ralph, who are truly legends in their industries. Many of these

　　joined us when we purchased their companies, but in recent years we

　　have also identified a number of strong managers internally. We further

　　expanded our corps of all-stars in an important way when we acquired

　　General Re and EJA.

　　时至今日，Berkshire 有一大群杰出的明星份子，就像Ralph等在各自的产业

　　都是一方之霸，其中很多人是在我们买下公司时，就已经加入了我们的行列，不

　　过近来年我们也从内部发掘了不少的人才，而最近在购并通用再保与EJA之后，

　　更让我们的梦幻队伍声势大振。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Charlie and I have the easy jobs at Berkshire: We do very littl

　　except allocate capital. And, even then, we are not all that energetic. We

　　have one excuse, though: In allocating capital, activity does not

　　correlate with achievement. Indeed, in the fields of investments and

　　acquisitions, frenetic behavior is often counterproductive. Therefore,

　　Charlie and I mainly just wait for the phone to ring.

　　查理跟我在Berkshire的工作其实很简单，主要的任务就是资金分配，即便是如

　　此我们的态度也不是那么的积极，其中有一个原因在于做的多，不代表就拿得

　　多，事实上，在投资与购并的世界中，疯狂的行为往往会造成反效果，也因此查

　　理跟我通常都只是静静地等待电话铃响。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Our managers, however, work very hard -- and it shows

　　Naturally, they want to be paid fairly for their efforts, but pay alone can't

　　explain their extraordinary accomplishments. Instead, each is primarily

　　motivated by a vision of just how far his or her business can go -- and

　　by a desire to be the one who gets it there. Charlie and I thank them on

　　your behalf and ours.

　　当然我们的经理人也非常的努力，且成效显著，而很自然的，他们也希望自己的

　　努力可以得到公平的对待，只是金钱的报酬并不足以解释他们为何能有这样杰出

　　的成就，主要的动力还在于每个经理人都想要了解自己所带领的企业到底能够发

　　挥到怎样的境界，为此，查理跟我谨代表大家向他们致上十二万分的谢意。

　　* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Additional information about our various businesses is given o

　　pages 39-53, where you will also find our segment earnings reported

　　on a GAAP basis. In addition, on pages 65-71, we have rearranged

　　Berkshire's financial data into four segments on a non-GAAP basis, a

　　presentation that corresponds to the way Charlie and I think about the

　　company.

　　在年报中你可以找到依照一般公认会计原则编制，详细的部门别信息，另外你还

　　可以找到经过重编，依照Berkshire四大部门编排的信息，这是查理跟我认为最

　　能够完整呈现Berkshire现况的模式。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Normally, we follow this section with one on "Look-Through

　　Earnings. Because the General Re acquisition occurred near yearend,

　　though, neither a historical nor a pro-forma calculation of a 1998

　　number seems relevant. We will resume the look-through calculation in

　　next year's report.

　　通常接下来这一段应该是报告完整透视盈余，但是由于通用再保的购并案发生的

　　时点接近年底，所以不管是历史性或拟制性的1998年的获利数字都已无关紧

　　要，在明年的报告中，我们会再恢复完整透视盈余的计算式。

　　Investments

　　投资

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Below we present our common stock investments. Those with

　　market value of more than $750 million are itemized.

　　下表是Berkshire市价超过七亿五千万美元以上的股票投资。

　　12/31/98

　　Shares

　　Company

　　Cost*

　　Market

　　(dollars in millions)

　　50,536,900

　　American Express Company .. . . . .

　　$1,470

　　$ 5,180

　　200,000,000

　　The Coca-Cola Company . . . . . . .. .

　　1,299

　　13,400

　　51,202,242

　　The Walt Disney Company . . . . . .

　　281

　　1,536

　　60,298,000

　　Freddie Mac ..

　　308

　　3,885

　　96,000,000

　　The Gillette Company . . . . . . . .

　　600

　　4,590

　　1,727,765

　　The Washington Post Company . . . . . .

　　11

　　999

　　63,595,180

　　Wells Fargo & Company . . . .. . . .

　　392

　　2,540

　　Others . . . . . . .. . . .

　　2,683

　　5,135

　　Total Common Stocks . . . . . . . .

　　$ 7,044

　　$ 37,265

　　=====

　　=====

　　Represents tax-basis cost which, in aggregate, is $1.5 billion less than GAAP cost.

　　*系以税务为基础的成本，比一般公认会计原则的账面成本少15亿美元。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　During the year, we slightly increased our holdings in America

　　Express, one of our three largest commitments, and left the other two

　　unchanged. However, we trimmed or substantially cut many of our

　　smaller positions. Here, I need to make a confession (ugh): The portfolio

　　actions I took in 1998 actually decreased our gain for the year. In

　　particular, my decision to sell McDonald's was a very big mistake.

　　Overall, you would have been better off last year if I had regularly snuck

　　off to the movies during market hours.

　　今年我们稍微提高了在美国运通的持股，至于其余另外两项重大的股票投资则维

　　持不变，不过在此同时我们也大幅出脱其余一些较小的投资部位，在这里我也必

　　须承认，嗯! 我在1998年做的一些举动事实上导致我们的利得不增反减，尤其

　　是决定卖出麦当劳使得我们损失惨重，也就是说如果去年我在股票交易时间一动

　　也不动的话，大家可能会更好过一点。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　At yearend, we held more than $15 billion in cash equivalent

　　(including high-grade securities due in less than one year). Cash never

　　makes us happy. But it's better to have the money burning a hole in

　　Berkshire's pocket than resting comfortably in someone else's. Charlie

　　and I will continue our search for large equity investments or, better yet,

　　a really major business acquisition that would absorb our liquid assets.

　　Currently, however, we see nothing on the horizon.

　　到年底，我们手上持有超过150亿美元的约当现金(包含一年内到期的优质债

　　券)，抱着这么多现金让我们感到相当不自在，但是我们宁愿让这150亿美元放

　　在我们的手里发痒，也不要让他们轻轻松松落入他人的口袋里，当然查理跟我还

　　是会继续去寻找合适的大型股票投资，当然要是能来一个真正的企业购并案会更

　　好，以消化我们手上过剩的流动资金，不过到目前为止，我们还没有发现任何潜

　　在的目标。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Once we knew that the General Re merger would definitely ke

　　place, we asked the company to dispose of the equities that it held. (As

　　mentioned earlier, we do not manage the Cologne Re portfolio, which

　　includes many equities.) General Re subsequently eliminated its

　　positions in about 250 common stocks, incurring $935 million of taxes

　　in the process. This "clean sweep" approach reflects a basic principle

　　that Charlie and I employ in business and investing: We don't back into

　　decisions.

　　当整个合并案正式敲定之后，我们立刻要求公司处分掉手头上所有的股票投资

　　(就像之前提到过的，这不包含科隆再保手上持有的各类有价证券)，而通用再保

　　也立刻将手上超过250种以上的股票出脱，为此还缴了9.35亿美元的税，这个

　　清仓的动作充分反应查理跟我在经营与投资上的基本原则，我们不替过去决策背

　　书。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Last year I deviated from my standard practice of not disclosin

　　our investments (other than those we are legally required to report) and

　　told you about three unconventional investments we had made. There

　　were several reasons behind that disclosure. First, questions about our

　　silver position that we had received from regulatory authorities led us to

　　believe that they wished us to publicly acknowledge this investment.

　　Second, our holdings of zero-coupon bonds were so large that we

　　wanted our owners to know of this investment's potential impact on

　　Berkshire's net worth. Third, we simply wanted to alert you to the fact

　　that we sometimes do make unconventional commitments.

　　去年我打破从来不主动公开投资组合的惯例(除非法令有特别要求)，告诉大家我

　　们最近参与的三项不同于以往的投资，之所以会这样做主要有几个原因，第一关

　　于投资银币，主管机关提出的一些问题，让我们感觉他们希望我们能够公开承认

　　这项投资的存在，第二由于零息债券的投资部位大到让我们觉得还是让我们的股

　　东知道这项投资对公司净值的影响性会比较好，第三我们只是要让大家知道，三

　　不五时我们还是会做出一些与以往大不相同的投资动作。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Normally, however, as discussed in the Owner's Manual on pag

　　61, we see no advantage in talking about specific investment actions.

　　Therefore -- unless we again take a position that is particularly large -

　　- we will not post you as to what we are doing in respect to any specific

　　holding of an unconventional sort. We can report, however, that we have

　　eliminated certain of the positions discussed last year and added certain

　　others.

　　不过就像是我们在股东手册一再提到的，我们不认为主动揭露特定的投资动作会

　　给公司带来任何的好处，也因此除非我们再度在某些特别的项目有非常大笔投

　　资，我们将不会再向各位报告我们在某些非传统投资的有关事项，当然我们还是

　　会定期向大家报告去年我们出脱的某些部位或是新增了某些投资部位。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Our never-comment-even-if-untrue policy in regard t

　　investments may disappoint "piggybackers" but will benefit owners:

　　Your Berkshire shares would be worth less if we discussed what we are

　　doing. Incidentally, we should warn you that media speculation about

　　our investment moves continues in most cases to be incorrect. People

　　who rely on such commentary do so at their own peril.

　　我们这种对投资"就算不对也不评论"的做法，虽然让一些有意搭顺风车的人无法

　　得逞，但却也能达到保护股东权益的目的，因为如果我们不断地公开讨论所有的

　　投资细节，将会严重损及各位所持有的Berkshire股份的价值，同时我也要提醒

　　大家通常媒体报导有关我们的投资动向往往都是错误的，相信他们话的人可能会

　　自食恶果。

　　Accounting -- Part 1

　　会计问题-第一部份

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Our General Re acquisition put a spotlight on an egregious fw

　　in accounting procedure. Sharp-eyed shareholders reading our proxy

　　statement probably noticed an unusual item on page 60. In the pro-

　　forma statement of income -- which detailed how the combined 1997

　　earnings of the two entities would have been affected by the merger --

　　there was an item stating that compensation expense would have been

　　increased by $63 million.

　　我们与通用再保之间的购并案反映出会计原则一直以来存在的一个重大瑕疵，眼

　　尖的股东在阅读合并相关的股东会文件时，应该都会发现其中有一项不寻常的项

　　目，在拟制性的损益表中，清楚仿真出如果两者1997年的盈余如果在合并后会

　　是怎么的结果，其中有一项薪资酬劳费用因为合并而增加了6,300万美元。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　This item, we hasten to add, does not signal that either Charlie o

　　I have experienced a major personality change. (He still travels coach

　　and quotes Ben Franklin.) Nor does it indicate any shortcoming in

　　General Re's accounting practices, which have followed GAAP to the

　　letter. Instead, the pro-forma adjustment came about because we are

　　replacing General Re's longstanding stock option plan with a cash plan

　　that ties the incentive compensation of General Re managers to their

　　operating achievements. Formerly what counted for these managers

　　was General Re's stock price; now their payoff will come from the

　　business performance they deliver.

　　这个项目我必须特别强调的是并不代表查理跟我的个性有任何重大的改变(他还

　　是一样搭乘长途巴士出差，并以富兰克林的名字订位)，同时也不表示通用再保

　　本身的会计政策有何疏失之处，该公司业已完全依照一般公认会计原则运作，实

　　际的情形是我们特别要求通用再保将原先发给员工的认股权全部以等值的现金

　　奖励取代，在此之前与这些经理人本身权益息息相关的是公司的股价，在此之

　　后，他们可以领到的报酬完全要看他们各自负责单位的绩效表现。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The new plan and the terminated option arrangement hav

　　matching economics, which means that the rewards they deliver to

　　employees should, for a given level of performance, be the same. But

　　what these people could have formerly anticipated earning from new

　　option grants will now be paid in cash. (Options granted in past years

　　remain outstanding.)

　　新的计划与先前的认股权计划对公司员工来说具有相同的效益，也就是说在相同

　　的表现之下，公司给予员工同样的报酬奖励，只不过原先大家预期可以获得的股

　　票将会改以现金取代，(至于先前已经发放的选择权则继续保持流通在外)。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Though the two plans are an economic wash, the cash plan w

　　are putting in will produce a vastly different accounting result. This

　　Alice-in-Wonderland outcome occurs because existing accounting

　　principles ignore the cost of stock options when earnings are being

　　calculated, even though options are a huge and increasing expense at a

　　great many corporations. In effect, accounting principles offer

　　management a choice: Pay employees in one form and count the cost, or

　　pay them in another form and ignore the cost. Small wonder then that

　　the use of options has mushroomed. This lop-sided choice has a big

　　downside for owners, however: Though options, if properly structured,

　　can be an appropriate, and even ideal, way to compensate and motivate

　　top managers, they are more often wildly capricious in their distribution

　　of rewards, inefficient as motivators, and inordinately expensive for

　　shareholders.

　　虽然两项计划在经济实质上相当，但我们改采的现金奖励计划在会计账面上却相

　　当不利，这种爱莉丝梦游仙境的结果主要起源于会计原则在计算公司获利时，根

　　本上忽略认股权的成本，虽然在许多大企业员工认股权早已成为公司庞大的成本

　　负担，事实上，会计原则给予公司经理人一个相当弹性的空间，若你以这种形式

　　给予员工报酬，就必须计入成本，但若你以另一种形式给予员工报酬，就不必计

　　入成本，也难怪员工认股权已经到了过度泛滥的地步，一面倒地采用这种方式使

　　得公司的股东权益大大受损，虽然我承认选择权若能够好好的规划，有时候是可

　　以成为一种补偿同时激励高阶经理人的好方法，只是大部分的时候，他们通常过

　　于慷慨，严重损及原有股东的利益，并不适合作为一项好的激励工具。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Whatever the merits of options may be, their accountin

　　treatment is outrageous. Think for a moment of that $190 million we

　　are going to spend for advertising at GEICO this year. Suppose that

　　instead of paying cash for our ads, we paid the media in ten-year, at-

　　the-market Berkshire options. Would anyone then care to argue that

　　Berkshire had not borne a cost for advertising, or should not be charged

　　this cost on its books?

　　不过不管选择权到底有怎样的优点，有关它们的会计处理原则实在是太离谱，试

　　想今年我们预计投入1.9亿美元在GEICO汽车保险的广告之上，假若我们不支

　　付现金而改以同等价值的Berkshire股票选择权作为给予厂商的对价，那么有没

　　有人会跳出来说Berkshire的广告怎么就可以不花一毛钱，难道它不应该反应在

　　公司的会计帐簿之上吗?

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Perhaps Bishop Berkeley -- you may remember him as th

　　philosopher who mused about trees falling in a forest when no one was

　　around -- would believe that an expense unseen by an accountant does

　　not exist. Charlie and I, however, have trouble being philosophical

　　about unrecorded costs. When we consider investing in an option-

　　issuing company, we make an appropriate downward adjustment to

　　reported earnings, simply subtracting an amount equal to what the

　　company could have realized by publicly selling options of like quantity

　　and structure. Similarly, if we contemplate an acquisition, we include in

　　our evaluation the cost of replacing any option plan. Then, if we make a

　　deal, we promptly take that cost out of hiding.

　　或许Berkeley主教，(大家或许还记得他曾经提到一棵倒在无人迹深山中的大树

　　的笑话)，会真的相信会计师没有发现的成本就代表它不存在，不过要查理跟我

　　接受这样的概念实在是有点困难，当我们考虑要投资一家有发行选择权的公司，

　　我们会先将这家公司的获利能力向下修正，直接扣除若对外公开发行这些选择权

　　所能得到的对价，同样的，要是我们准备要购并一家公司时，我们也会将更换原

　　有选择权的成本列入考量，然后等到合并案正式通过后，我们会立即将相关成本

　　反应在会计帐上。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Readers who disagree with me about options will by this time b

　　mentally quarreling with my equating the cost of options issued to

　　employees with those that might theoretically be sold and traded

　　publicly. It is true, to state one of these arguments, that employee

　　options are sometimes forfeited -- that lessens the damage done to

　　shareholders -- whereas publicly-offered options would not be. It is

　　true, also, that companies receive a tax deduction when employee

　　options are exercised; publicly-traded options deliver no such benefit.

　　But there's an offset to these points: Options issued to employees are

　　often repriced, a transformation that makes them much more costly

　　than the public variety.

　　不同意我对选择权看法的读者这时可能会抗议我将发给员工认股权的成本跟对

　　外公开发行的股票选择权划上等号，没有错，在这些争辩中，员工的认股权有时

　　会被没收，使得股东权益受损的程度有可能会减小，公开发行的选择权就没有这

　　项优点，而员工在行使认股权时，公司也可因而获得抵税权，公开发行的选择权

　　也没有这项好处，但是在另外一方面，员工选择权的转换价格常常会做修正，比

　　起公开发行的选择权来说，所付出的代价更为高昂。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　It's sometimes argued that a non-transferable option given to a

　　employee is less valuable to him than would be a publicly-traded option

　　that he could freely sell. That fact, however, does not reduce the cost of

　　the non-transferable option Giving an employee a company car that can

　　only be used for certain purposes diminishes its value to the employee,

　　but does not in the least diminish its cost to the employer.

　　也有人认为限制移转的员工认股权其价值对于员工来说，比没有可以公开交易的

　　选择权来得低，但这种讲法并没有办法淡化公司发行认股权给员工所需付出的代

　　价，就像是公司配给员工的配车，虽然限制员工只能作为公务使用，但是这并不

　　代表公司就可以不必花钱买车。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The earning revisions that Charlie and I have made for options i

　　recent years have frequently cut the reported per-share figures by 5%,

　　with 10% not all that uncommon. On occasion, the downward

　　adjustment has been so great that it has affected our portfolio

　　decisions, causing us either to make a sale or to pass on a stock

　　purchase we might otherwise have made.

　　而查理跟我在对这类选择权所作的盈余修正通常会在5%以上，而就算是10%以

　　上的幅度也不会令人感到意外，有时调整的幅度甚至大到影响我们的投资决策，

　　有时更因此被迫要将持股卖出或是放弃买进原先看上的投资标的。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　A few years ago we asked three questions in these pages t

　　which we have not yet received an answer: "If options aren't a form of

　　compensation, what are they? If compensation isn't an expense, what is

　　it? And, if expenses shouldn't go into the calculation of earnings, where

　　in the world should they go?"

　　几年前，我们就曾提出至今还没有得到解答的三个问题，"如果选择权不算是一

　　种报酬的话，那它又算是什么? 而如果给予员工的报酬不算是一种费用的话? 那

　　它又算是什么? 而如果费用不必列入损益表计算盈余的话，那么又应该把它们摆

　　到哪里去呢??"

　　Accounting -- Part 2

　　会计问题-第二部份

　　　 　 　 　 　The role that managements have played in stock-option

　　accounting has hardly been benign: A distressing number of both CEOs

　　and auditors have in recent years bitterly fought FASB's attempts to

　　replace option fiction with truth and virtually none have spoken out in

　　support of FASB. Its opponents even enlisted Congress in the fight,

　　pushing the case that inflated figures were in the national interest.

　　管理阶层在员工认股选择权会计问题上所扮演的角色绝对不能马虎，最近有一群

　　公司主管与会计师极力反对美国财务会计准则委员会打算将原先不实的选择权

　　予以更正，但结果却没有人公开表示支持，反对者甚至动员国会议员参与游说，

　　将这种虚增盈余的议题提升到国家利益的层次。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Still, I believe that the behavior of managements has been eve

　　worse when it comes to restructurings and merger accounting. Here,

　　many managements purposefully work at manipulating numbers and

　　deceiving investors. And, as Michael Kinsley has said about Washington:

　　"The scandal isn't in what's done that's illegal but rather in what's legal."

　　此外，我认为有些管理当局在公司再造与合并的会计处理上的心态更为可议，很

　　多管理当局刻意操纵损益，欺骗投资人，而就像Michael Kinsley曾经批评华府

　　的"真正的丑闻不是那些违反法律的，而是那些完全合法的行为"。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　It was once relatively easy to tell the good guys in accountin

　　from the bad: The late 1960's, for example, brought on an orgy of what

　　one charlatan dubbed "bold, imaginative accounting" (the practice of

　　which, incidentally, made him loved for a time by Wall Street because he

　　never missed expectations). But most investors of that period knew who

　　was playing games. And, to their credit, virtually all of America's most-

　　admired companies then shunned deception.

　　在以前透过财务报表，很容易可以分辨一家公司的好坏，但时至1960年代后

　　期，却掀起一波骗徒称之为"大胆且富想象力的会计"的热潮，(这种做法在当时受

　　到华尔街人士的热烈欢迎，因为他们从来都不会让人失望)，不过在当时大家都

　　知道谁是老千，至于一般受到崇敬的美国大公司基本上都洁身自好，相当爱惜自

　　己的羽毛。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　In recent years, probity has eroded. Many major corporations stil

　　play things straight, but a significant and growing number of otherwise

　　high-grade managers -- CEOs you would be happy to have as spouses

　　for your children or as trustees under your will -- have come to the view

　　that it's okay to manipulate earnings to satisfy what they believe are Wall

　　Street's desires. Indeed, many CEOs think this kind of manipulation is

　　not only okay, but actually their duty.

　　只是近年来，道德逐渐沦丧，虽然许多大企业还是开大门走大路，不过却有越来

　　越多所谓高格调的经理人，(就是那种你想要把女儿许配给他或请他担任遗嘱执

　　行人的人)，渐渐认为玩弄数字以符合华尔街预期的做法没有什么大不了的，没

　　错，有许多经理人不但觉得这类操纵数字的行为很正常，甚至是他们的工作责任

　　之一。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　These managers start with the assumption, all too common, tha

　　their job at all times is to encourage the highest stock price possible (a

　　premise with which we adamantly disagree). To pump the price, they

　　strive, admirably, for operational excellence. But when operations don't

　　produce the result hoped for, these CEOs resort to unadmirable

　　accounting stratagems. These either manufacture the desired

　　"earnings" or set the stage for them in the future.

　　这些经理人一开始往往就认定他们的主要工作之一是让公司的股价越高越好，

　　(关于这点我们实在不敢苟同)，而为了撑高股价，他们可以说是无所不用其极地

　　在公司营运上冲刺，只是当公司营运结果不若预期时，他们自然而然地会想到运

　　用不当的会计手法，不是"制造"出想要的盈余数字，就是预埋伏笔，在未来的盈

　　余做手脚。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Rationalizing this behavior, these managers often say that thei

　　shareholders will be hurt if their currency for doing deals -- that is, their

　　stock -- is not fully-priced, and they also argue that in using accounting

　　shenanigans to get the figures they want, they are only doing what

　　everybody else does. Once such an everybody's-doing-it attitude takes

　　hold, ethical misgivings vanish. Call this behavior Son of Gresham: Bad

　　accounting drives out good.

　　而为了让这样的行为合理化，这些经理人常常表示如果公司股票的价格不能合理

　　反应其价值，则公司股东的权益将会受损，同时他们也声称运用会计骗术以得到

　　想要的数字的做法很普遍，而一旦这种"别人都这样，为何我不行"的想法生根

　　后，道德方面的顾虑早已消失殆尽，Gresham之子称这样的行为叫做:邪恶的会

　　计创造出伪装的善良。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The distortiodu jour is the "restructuring charge," an

　　accounting entry that can, of course, be legitimate but that too often is a

　　device for manipulating earnings. In this bit of legerdemain, a large

　　chunk of costs that should properly be attributed to a number of years

　　is dumped into a single quarter, typically one already fated to

　　disappoint investors. In some cases, the purpose of the charge is to

　　clean up earnings misrepresentations of the past, and in others it is to

　　prepare the ground for future misrepresentations. In either case, the

　　size and timing of these charges is dictated by the cynical proposition

　　that Wall Street will not mind if earnings fall short by $5 per share in a

　　given quarter, just as long as this deficiency ensures that quarterly

　　earnings in the future will consistently exceed expectations by five

　　cents per share.

　　有一种会计科目叫做"重整损失"，在法理上虽然属于合法但却通常被当作操纵损

　　益的工具，通常公司会将多年来累积的开支在单一个季节一次提列损失，这是一

　　种典型让投资人大失所望的骗术，有时候，公司则是为了将过去塑造不实在的盈

　　余所累积的垃圾一次出清或是为虚增未来年度的盈余预先做铺路，不管怎样，这

　　些做法的主要前提都是抓住华尔街只关心未来年度的盈余高于预期五分钱，却一

　　点也不在乎公司当季的盈余少了五块钱的心理。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　This dump-everything-into-one-quarter behior suggests a

　　corresponding "bold, imaginative" approach to -- golf scores. In his

　　first round of the season, a golfer should ignore his actual performance

　　and simply fill his card with atrocious numbers -- double, triple,

　　quadruple bogeys -- and then turn in a score of, say, 140. Having

　　established this "reserve," he should go to the golf shop and tell his pro

　　that he wishes to "restructure" his imperfect swing. Next, as he takes his

　　new swing onto the course, he should count his good holes, but not the

　　bad ones. These remnants from his old swing should be charged

　　instead to the reserve established earlier. At the end of five rounds,

　　then, his record will be 140, 80, 80, 80, 80 rather than 91, 94, 89, 94,

　　92. On Wall Street, they will ignore the 140 -- which, after all, came

　　from a "discontinued" swing -- and will classify our hero as an 80

　　shooter (and one who never disappoints).

　　这种将所有的垃圾在当季一次出清的做法跟高尔夫球场上一种大胆偷机的方法

　　类似，在球季一开始，取巧的高尔夫球员不管本身实际的实力，先在计分卡上填

　　上最离谱的成绩-柏忌、双柏忌、三柏忌，结果一算下来可能有140杆之多，接

　　着他再跑到高尔夫球店给教练表示他想要调整一下不理想的挥杆，然后等到他再

　　度回到球场上时，他就专挑好的洞的成绩，而不好的部份则全部归到先前所预留

　　的准备，结果五回合下来，他的成绩就变成140杆、80杆、80杆、80杆、80

　　杆，而不是本来的91杆、94杆、89杆、94杆、92杆，不过对华尔街的哪些

　　人来说，他们根本就不管最前面的140杆，因为那不是正常情况下的表现，然

　　后直接把这位选手归类为平均80杆的高手(而且成绩还相当稳定)。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　For those who prefer to cheat up front, there would be a varian

　　of this strategy. The golfer, playing alone with a cooperative caddy-

　　auditor, should defer the recording of bad holes, take four 80s, accept

　　the plaudits he gets for such athleticism and consistency, and then turn

　　in a fifth card carrying a 140 score. After rectifying his earlier

　　scorekeeping sins with this "big bath," he may mumble a few apologies

　　but will refrain from returning the sums he has previously collected

　　from comparing scorecards in the clubhouse. (The caddy, need we add,

　　will have acquired a loyal patron.)

　　而对于这种喜欢偷鸡摸狗的球员来说，有几个变量是他们要注意的，首先球员要

　　找到能够配合的杆弟-也就是会计师，好让他可以将不好的洞数往后递延，顺利

　　地先拿下四局80杆，使得这位球员可以得到表现杰出且稳定的运动家称号后，

　　然后再偷偷地把第五局的140杆球卡交出，结果只见到他随便应付几句抱歉的

　　话语便间接承认先前计算成绩时候的罪行，而且他还会不断地拿着自己的成绩跟

　　其它好手相比，(而这位杆弟，不用我们说，当然是深得其老板的心，不怕下次

　　得不到主人的惠顾)。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Unfortunately, CE who use variations of these scoring schemes

　　in real life tend to become addicted to the games they're playing -- after

　　all, it's easier to fiddle with the scorecard than to spend hours on the

　　practice tee -- and never muster the will to give them up. Their behavior

　　brings to mind Voltaire's comment on sexual experimentation: "Once a

　　philosopher, twice a pervert."

　　不幸的是，这些惯用作弊技俩的总裁在回到现实世界后，还是习惯玩这种把戏，

　　毕竟与其花费时间在辛苦练习上，还不如轻轻松松在计分卡上动手脚，要说服他

　　们放弃不玩可能比登天还难，他们这种行为不禁让我想到法国文豪伏尔泰

　　Voltaire对于性实验的评论：「一回生，二回熟。」(编按伏尔泰头一次到妓院

　　去体验那里的情境，事后有人问他感觉如何，他回答说，第一次去还算是哲学家，

　　但要是再去的话，可能便会成为堕落者)。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　In the acquisition arena, restructuring habeen raised to an art

　　form: Managements now frequently use mergers to dishonestly

　　rearrange the value of assets and liabilities in ways that will allow them

　　to both smooth and swell future earnings. Indeed, at deal time, major

　　auditing firms sometimes point out the possibilities for a little

　　accounting magic (or for a lot). Getting this push from the pulpit, first-

　　class people will frequently stoop to third-class tactics. CEOs

　　understandably do not find it easy to reject auditor-blessed strategies

　　that lead to increased future "earnings."

　　在购并的世界里，组织重整早已被提升至艺术的层次，经理人现在越来越习惯透

　　过合并来操控公司资产与负债的价值，以使得公司未来的盈余能够平稳地虚增，

　　事实上，在交易的时候，大型的会计师事务所偶尔也会建议公司来点小小会计戏

　　法(当然有时也可能会搞的很大)，而在得到领路者的引诱，一流的人格往往会屈

　　服于三流的伎俩，CEO实在是很难拒绝会计师所提出让公司未来盈余好看一点

　　的美意。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　An example from e property-casualty insurance industry will

　　illuminate the possibilities. When a p-c company is acquired, the buyer

　　sometimes simultaneously increases its loss reserves, often

　　substantially. This boost may merely reflect the previous inadequacy of

　　reserves -- though it is uncanny how often an actuarial "revelation" of

　　this kind coincides with the inking of a deal. In any case, the move sets

　　up the possibility of 'earnings" flowing into income at some later date,

　　as reserves are released.

　　产物意外险业有一个很好的例子可以作为说明，当一家公司取得另一家产险公司

　　时，买方通常会顺势大幅补提拨大量的损失准备，这项举动只会凸显以前损失准

　　备提拨不足的问题，虽然你会发现这种精算调整的时机与整个交易签字的时点是

　　如此令人惊异的吻合，更重要的是，这样的举动等于是为以后损失准备回冲，以

　　增加公司未来获利数字所预埋的伏笔。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Berkshire has kept entirely clear of these practices: If we are t

　　disappoint you, we would rather it be with our earnings than with our

　　accounting. In all of our acquisitions, we have left the loss reserve

　　figures exactly as we found them. After all, we have consistently joined

　　with insurance managers knowledgeable about their business and

　　honest in their financial reporting. When deals occur in which liabilities

　　are increased immediately and substantially, simple logic says that at

　　least one of those virtues must have been lacking -- or, alternatively,

　　that the acquirer is laying the groundwork for future infusions of

　　"earnings."

　　不过Berkshire从来都不会干这类的勾当，如果我们真要让你们失望，那么决定

　　会是真实的获利情况而不是会计手法，在我们所有的购并案当中，我们皆让损失

　　准备的数字保持在当初我们发觉时的水准，因为一直以来与我们共事的保险事业

　　经理人都很了解自己本业的状况，同时在财务报表的编制上也都坦诚布公，所以

　　要是在这些购并案进行的同时，还发生负债大幅增加的状况的话，那么就代表这

　　些美德其中之一出现了问题，或者说购并者为虚增未来盈余预留的后路。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Here's a true story that illustrates an all-too-common view i

　　corporate America. The CEOs of two large banks, one of them a man

　　who'd made many acquisitions, were involved not long ago in a friendly

　　merger discussion (which in the end didn't produce a deal). The veteran

　　acquirer was expounding on the merits of the possible combination,

　　only to be skeptically interrupted by the other CEO: "But won't that mean

　　a huge charge," he asked, "perhaps as much as $1 billion?" The

　　"sophisticate" wasted no words: "We'll make it bigger than that -- that's

　　why we're doing the deal."

　　这里有一件真实的故事充分说明美国企业普遍存在的一种观点，有两家大型银行

　　的CEO，其中有一位主导了很多购并案，在不久前参与了一项友善购并的讨论(虽

　　然后来并没有成功)，正当这位经验丰富的购并老手侃侃而谈合并后可能的种种

　　好处时，突然被另一位CEO的问题给打断：「那不是要耗费相当高的成本吗? 我

　　想可能不下十亿美元吧!」这位老练的银行家毫不迟疑的回答到：「这正是我们

　　要搞这个案子的原因，而且我们可以把它搞的更大。」

　　　 　 　 　 　 　A preliminary tally by R. G. Associes, of Baltimore, of special

　　charges taken or announced during 1998 -- that is, charges for

　　restructuring, in-process R&D, merger-related items, and write-downs

　　-- identified no less than 1,369 of these, totaling $72.1 billion. That is a

　　staggering amount as evidenced by this bit of perspective: The 1997

　　earnings of the 500 companies in Fortune's famous list totaled $324

　　billion.

　　根据巴尔的摩R.G.协会初步的统计，光是1998年宣布或认列的特别开支，也

　　就是包含组织重整开支、R&D、购并费用以及相关科目打销等1,369种各项名

　　义，加总的金额就超过721亿美元，相较之下1997年财星500大企业的总获

　　利也不过是3,240亿美元而已。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Clearly the attitude of disrespect that many executives hav

　　today for accurate reporting is a business disgrace. And auditors, as we

　　have already suggested, have done little on the positive side. Though

　　auditors should regard the investing public as their client, they tend to

　　kowtow instead to the managers who choose them and dole out their

　　pay. ("Whose bread I eat, his song I sing.")

　　很显然的，现今许多经理人对于编制正确报表的藐视态度可说是商业界的一大耻

　　辱，而另一方面如我们先前所提到的，会计师却未能够导正这样的偏差，尽管理

　　论上会计师应该要把投资大众当作是他们的老板，但他们却宁可向那些有权决定

　　会计师人选的经理人弯腰磕头以求分一杯羹，(唉! 正所谓拿人手短)。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　A big piece of news, however, is that the SEC, led by its chairman

　　Arthur Levitt, seems determined to get corporate America to clean up its

　　act. In a landmark speech last September, Levitt called for an end to

　　"earnings management." He correctly observed, "Too many corporate

　　managers, auditors and analysts are participants in a game of nods and

　　winks." And then he laid on a real indictment: "Managing may be giving

　　way to manipulating; integrity may be losing out to illusion."

　　不过告诉各位一个大消息，在现任主席Arthur Levitt的带领下，主管机关证管

　　会似乎有意要好好地整顿美国企业的种种不当行为，在去年九月的一次历史性演

　　说中，Levitt呼吁大家停止"盈余管理"，他一针见血地指出太多的企业经理人、

　　会计师与分析师参与这种大家心知肚明的戏局，接着他又开门见山地提出一项指

　　控，当经理人得到太多的机会来操纵盈余的同时，其人格也随着消失殆尽化成幻

　　影。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　I urge you to read the Chairman's speech (you can fd it on the

　　Internet at www.sec.gov) and to support him in his efforts to get

　　corporate America to deliver a straight story to its owners. Levitt's job

　　will be Herculean, but it is hard to think of another more important for

　　him to take on.

　　我强烈建议大家读一读Levitt主席的演说内容(你可以在证管会的官方网站

　　www.sec.gov上找到)，同时共同声援他致力于导正美国企业向股东们提供真实

　　财务报告所作的努力，Levitt这项工作或许相当艰巨，但也很难再找到其它任何

　　比这个更重要的任务了。

　　Reports to Shareholders

　　给股东的报告

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Berkshire's Internet site, www.berkshirehathaway.com, ha

　　become a prime source for information about the company. While we

　　continue to send an annual report to all shareholders, we now send

　　quarterlies only to those who request them, letting others read these at

　　our site. In this report, we again enclose a card that can be returned by

　　those wanting to get printed quarterlies in 1999.

　　Berkshire的官方网站www.berkshirehathaway.com成为取得本公司信息的

　　最重要来源，除非事先要求，否则我们每季的季报都只透过网站对外公布，当然

　　我们还是一如往来将每年的年报邮寄给股东们，里头也包含了申请寄发1999年

　　季报的申请表格。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Charlie and I have two simple goals in reporting: 1) We want t

　　give you the information that we would wish you to give us if our

　　positions were reversed; and 2) We want to make Berkshire's

　　information accessible to all of you simultaneously. Our ability to reach

　　that second goal is greatly helped by the Internet.

　　在编写报告时，查理跟我禀持两个简单的原则：1)我们希望能够提供各位所有换

　　个立场我们希望各位能够提供给我们的所有信息；2)我们希望这些信息能够在同

　　一个时间到达所有人的手上，而透过网络使得我们第二个目标得以更容易地达

　　成。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　In another portion of his September speech, Arthur Levit

　　deplored what he called "selective disclosure." His remarks were timely:

　　Today, many companies matter-of-factly favor Wall Street analysts and

　　institutional investors in a variety of ways that often skirt or cross the

　　line of unfairness. These practices leave the great bulk of shareholders

　　at a distinct disadvantage to a favored class.

　　在演说的另一段内容中，Levitt主席对于他称之为"选择性揭露"的行为感到遗

　　憾，他的这项评论正中时弊，如今许多公司明显偏袒华尔街的分析师与机构投资

　　人，其种种行径早已踰越公平合理的界限，这种行为让其它广大的股东与投资大

　　众处于不利前者的劣势地位。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　At Berkshire, we regard the holder of one share of B stock as th

　　equal of our large institutional investors. We, of course, warmly

　　welcome institutions as owners and have gained a number of them

　　through the General Re merger. We hope also that these new holders

　　find that our owner's manual and annual reports offer them more

　　insights and information about Berkshire than they garner about other

　　companies from the investor relations departments that these

　　corporations typically maintain. But if it is "earnings guidance" or the

　　like that shareholders or analysts seek, we will simply guide them to our

　　public documents.

　　在Berkshire即使是持有一股B股的小股东其所得到的待遇，也与其它大型投资

　　机构投资人并无二致，当然我们也很欢迎大型的投资机构法人成为我们的股东，

　　事实上经由通用再保的购并，确实也带进许多投资机构法人，同时我们也希望这

　　些新加入的股东能够发现由我们所提供的股东手册与公司年报，较之其它公司一

　　般公关部门所提供的讯息更为有用，给他们更多的启发，不过要是股东或分析师

　　想要的是公司的盈余预估，那么我们就只能请他们直接参考我们已对外公布的公

　　开文件。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　This year we plan tpost our quarterly reports on the Internet

　　after the close of the market on May 14, August 13, and November 12.

　　We also expect to put the 1999 annual report on our website on

　　Saturday, March 11, 2000, and to mail the print version at roughly the

　　same time.

　　今年我们预计分别在5/14、8/13及11/12将季报公布在公司的网站上，另外

　　也预计在2000年3月11日星期六将年报公布在网站上，并在同一时间将年报

　　邮寄出去给所有的股东。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　We promptly post press releases on our website. This means tha

　　you do not need to rely on the versions of these reported by the media

　　but can instead read the full text on your computer.

　　同时我们也会立即将相关的新闻公布在我们的网站上，也就是说你不需要依赖经

　　过报章媒体消化过的二手消息，而可以轻轻松松在家透过计算机直接读到最原始的

　　内容。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Despite the pathetic technical skills of your Chairman, I'

　　delighted to report that GEICO, Borsheim's, See's, and The Buffalo News

　　are now doing substantial business via the Internet. We've also recently

　　begun to offer annuity products on our website. This business was

　　developed by Ajit Jain, who over the last decade has personally

　　accounted for a significant portion of Berkshire's operating earnings.

　　While Charlie and I sleep, Ajit keeps thinking of new ways to add value to

　　Berkshire.

　　虽然本人的计算机技能相当的低落，但是我还是很高兴地向各位报告，我们旗下的

　　事业，包含GEICO、波仙珠宝、喜斯糖果以及水牛城新闻在内现在皆已透过网

　　路从事大量的商务活动，同时我们也开始在网站上贩卖相关的年金产品，这项业

　　务主要是由Ajit Jain所负责开发，他个人在过去十年来为Berkshire贡献了大

　　量的盈余，每当查理跟我休息时，Ajit还是无时无刻不在为Berkshire想出增进

　　价值的方法。

　　Shareholder-Designated Contributions

　　股东指定捐赠计划

　　　 　 　 　 　 　About 97.5% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshire'

　　1998 shareholder-designated contributions program, with

　　contributions totaling $16.9 million. A full description of the program

　　appears on pages 54-55.

　　大约有97.5%的有效股权参与1998年的股东指定捐赠计划，捐出的款项总计

　　约1,690万美元，详细的名单参阅附录。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Cumulatively, over the 18 years of the program, Berkshire ha

　　made contributions of $130 million pursuant to the instructions of our

　　shareholders. The rest of Berkshire's giving is done by our subsidiaries,

　　which stick to the philanthropic patterns that prevailed before they were

　　acquired (except that their former owners themselves take on the

　　responsibility for their personal charities). In aggregate, our

　　subsidiaries made contributions of $12.5 million in 1998, including

　　in-kind donations of $2.0 million.

　　累计过去18年以来，Berkshire总计已依照股东意愿捐赠出高达1.3亿美元的

　　款项，除了之外，Berkshire还透过旗下的子公司进行捐赠，而这些慈善活动都

　　是早在他们被我们购并以前就行之有年的(先前的老板自行本身负责的个人捐赠

　　计划之外除外)，总的来说，我们旗下的关系企业在1998年总计捐出1,250万

　　美元，其中包含200万美元等值的物品。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　To participate in future programs, you must own Class A share

　　that are registered in the name of the actual owner, not the nominee

　　name of a broker, bank or depository. Shares not so registered on

　　August 31, 1999, will be ineligible for the 1999 program. When you get

　　the contributions form from us, return it promptly so that it does not

　　get put aside or forgotten. Designations received after the due date will

　　not be honored.

　　想要参加这项计划者，必须拥有A级普通股，同时确定您的股份是登记在自己

　　而非股票经纪人或保管银行的名下，同时必须在1999年8月31日之前完成登

　　记，才有权利参与1999年的捐赠计划，当你收到表格后，请立即填写后寄回，

　　以免被丢在一旁给忘记了，逾期恕不受理。

　　The Annual Meeting

　　年度股东大会

　　　 　 　 　 　 　This year's Woodstock for Capitalists will be held May 1-3, an

　　we may face a problem. Last year more than 10,000 people attended

　　our annual meeting, and our shareholders list has since doubled. So we

　　don't quite know what attendance to expect this year. To be safe, we

　　have booked both Aksarben Coliseum, which holds about 14,000 and

　　the Holiday Convention Centre, which can seat an additional 5,000.

　　Because we know that our Omaha shareholders will want to be good

　　hosts to the out-of-towners (many of them come from outside the U.S),

　　we plan to give those visitors first crack at the Aksarben tickets and to

　　subsequently allocate these to greater Omaha residents on a first-

　　come, first-served basis. If we exhaust the Aksarben tickets, we will

　　begin distributing Holiday tickets to Omaha shareholders.

　　今年Berkshire的伍斯达克将在五月1号到3号举行，只是我们面临到一个问

　　题，去年总计有超过一万名的股东来参加我们的年度股东会，而如今我们股东的

　　人数又增加了一倍，这使得我们很难预估今年到底会有多少股东与会，为了安全

　　起见，我们特别订下可容纳14,000名观众的阿肯萨本体育馆，另外外加5,000

　　个座位的Holiday会议中心，而奥玛哈地区的股东们为了尽地主之谊，也特地

　　将场地的前排座位让给外城市来的股东(很多都来自海外)，至于大奥玛哈地区的

　　股东则采取先到先选的方式入座，如果阿肯萨本体育馆的门票发光了，就会开始

　　发放Holiday会议中心的门票给奥玛哈地区的股东。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　If we end up using both locations, Charlie and I will split ou

　　pre-meeting time between the two. Additionally, we will have exhibits

　　and also the Berkshire movie, large television screens and microphones

　　at both sites. When we break for lunch, many attendees will leave

　　Aksarben, which means that those at Holiday can, if they wish, make the

　　five-minute trip to Aksarben and finish out the day there. Buses will be

　　available to transport people who don't have cars.

　　而万一要是两个场地还不够，查理跟我就会将正式会议前的时间分成两部份，此

　　外，在两个会场我们都准备了展示品、Berkshire特别制作的影片、大型的电视

　　屏幕以及麦克风，等到中午休息时间，许多与会者陆续离开阿肯萨本体育馆后，

　　此时坐在Holiday会议中心的股东就可以利用简短的五分钟时间参观一下会

　　场，然后一直待到会议结束，会后我们也备有巴士接送没有开车的股东。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The doors will open at both locations at 7 a.m. on Monday, andt

　　8:30 we will premier the 1999 Berkshire movie epic, produced by Marc

　　Hamburg, our CFO. The meeting will last from 9:30 until 3:30,

　　interrupted only by the short lunch break.

　　大门会在星期一早上七点开放，同时照例在八点半会播放由我们财务长Marc

　　Hamburg精心制作具顶级水准的Berkshire 1999年电影短片供大家欣赏，扣

　　除中午短暂的休息时间，整个会议将一直进行到下午三点半。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　An attachment to the proxy material that is enclosed with thi

　　report explains how you can obtain the badge you will need for

　　admission to the meeting and other events. As for plane, hotel and car

　　reservations, we have again signed up American Express (800-799-

　　6634) to give you special help. In our normal fashion, we will run buses

　　from the larger hotels to the meeting. After the meeting, these will make

　　trips back to the hotels and to Nebraska Furniture Mart, Borsheim's and

　　the airport. Even so, you are likely to find a car useful.

　　后面附有股东会开会投票的相关数据，跟各位解释如何拿到入场所许的识别证，

　　由于预期会有相当多的人与会，我们建议大家最好先预订机位与住宿，美国运通

　　(电话800-799-6634)将会很高兴为您提供相关安排服务，如同以往，我们会

　　安排巴士接送大家往返各大旅馆与会场之间，并在会后接送大家到内布拉斯加家

　　具店与波仙珠宝店或是到饭店与机场，当然你可能会觉得如何有一辆车就更方便

　　了。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The full line of Berkshire products will be available atksarben,

　　and the more popular items will also be at Holiday. Last year we set

　　sales records across-the-board, moving 3,700 pounds of See's candy,

　　1,635 pairs of Dexter shoes, 1,150 sets of Quikut knives and 3,104

　　Berkshire shirts and hats. Additionally, $26,944 of World Book products

　　were purchased as well as more than 2,000 golf balls with the Berkshire

　　Hathaway logo. Charlie and I are pleased but not satisfied with these

　　numbers and confidently predict new records in all categories this year.

　　Our 1999 apparel line will be unveiled at the meeting, so please defer

　　your designer purchases until you view our collection.

　　在阿肯萨本体育馆的会场我们也将备有Berkshire全系列的产品供大家选购，另

　　外我们也会把其中最热门的商品陈列在Holiday会议中心，去年我们再度打破

　　记录，大家总共搬走了3,700磅的糖果、1,635双的鞋子、1,150组Quikut

　　小刀以及3,140件Berkshire的衣服与帽子，另外也卖出26,944美元的世界

　　百科全书与相关出版品以及2,000颗上面印有Berkshire Logo的高尔夫球，老

　　实说，查理跟我对于这样的成绩并不太满意，不过我们相当有信心今年一定能够

　　再度刷新所有品项的记录，而我们1999年全新的服装也将在会议期间公布，所

　　以请大家在看过我们的样式之前，暂且将今年的治装费保留住。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Dairy Queen will also be on hand and will again donate al

　　proceeds to the Children's Miracle Network. Last year we sold about

　　4,000 Dilly® bars, fudge bars and vanilla/orange bars. Additionally,

　　GEICO will have a booth that will be manned by a number of our top

　　counselors from around the country, all of them ready to supply you

　　with auto insurance quotes. In almost all cases, GEICO will be able to

　　offer you a special shareholder's discount. Check out whether we can

　　save you some money.

　　乳品皇后也将再度在现场摆设摊位，同时将所得全数捐给儿童希望联盟，去年我

　　们总共卖出4,000根Dilly、雪花棒以及香草/橘子口味的巧克力棒，此外GEICO

　　公司会再度派出各地区最优秀的业务员，在会场设立摊位，随时提供股东们汽车

　　保单的报价，在大多数的情况下，GEICO都可以提供给你一个相当优惠的股东

　　折扣，各位记得问看看是否能帮自己省下一笔钱。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Thpiece de resistance of our one-company trade show will be a

　　79-foot-long, nearly 12-foot-wide, fully-outfitted cabin of a 737

　　Boeing Business Jet ("BBJ"), which is NetJets' newest product. This plane

　　has a 14-hour range; is designed to carry 19 passengers; and offers a

　　bedroom, an office, and two showers. Deliveries to fractional owners

　　will begin in the first quarter of 2000.

　　这次的会议还有另一位主秀，那就是79英尺长、12英尺宽、全配备的波音737

　　商务机展示座舱(简称BBJ)，这是Netjet最新推出的产品，这架飞机飞行时数长

　　达14个小时，可搭载19位乘客，并附有一个卧室、一间办公室以及两套淋浴

　　设备，预计在2000年春季加入服务客户的行列。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　The BBJ will be available for your inspection on May 1-3 near th

　　entrance to the Aksarben hall. You should be able to minimize your wait

　　by making your visit on Saturday or Sunday. Bring along your checkbook

　　in case you decide to make an impulse purchase.

　　BBJ在五月1日到3日期间，将会陈列在阿肯萨本体育馆的大厅入口处，不想排

　　队的人最好提早在星期六或星期日去参观，记得随身携带你的支票本，以备一时

　　心动的不时之需。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　NFM's mti-stored complex, located on a 75-acre site about a

　　mile from Aksarben, is open from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. on weekdays, and

　　10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on Saturdays and Sundays. This operation did $300

　　million in business during 1998 and offers an unrivaled breadth of

　　merchandise -- furniture, electronics, appliances, carpets and

　　computers -- all at can't-be-beat prices. During the April 30th to May

　　4th period, shareholders presenting their meeting badge will receive a

　　discount that is customarily given only to its employees.

　　占地75英亩的NFM多层复合式建筑距离阿肯萨本体育馆约1英哩远，营业时

　　间平日从早上10点到下午9点，星期六及星期日则从早上10点到下午6点，

　　NFM 1998年单店的营业额高达三亿美元，提供各式各样的产品，举凡家具、

　　电子产品、小家电、地毯以及计算机，全部都以超低的价格供大家选购，在四月

　　30日到五月4日期间，股东只要持随股东开会通知单附赠的优惠券到NFM购

　　买各类商品，都可获得员工价的优惠。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Borsheim's normally is closedn Sunday but will be open for

　　shareholders from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. on May 2nd. On annual meeting

　　weekend last year, the store did an incredible amount of business. Sales

　　were double those of the previous year, and the store's volume on

　　Sunday greatly exceeded volume for any day in Borsheim's history.

　　Charlie attributes this record to the fact that he autographed sales

　　tickets that day and, while I have my doubts about this proposition, we

　　are not about to mess with a winning formula. Please give him writer's

　　cramp. On last year's Sunday, Borsheim's wrote 2,501 tickets during the

　　eight hours it was open. For those of you who are mathematically

　　challenged, that is one ticket every 11 seconds.

　　平时礼拜天不营业的波仙珠宝，特地在五月二日股东会当天会为股东与来宾开

　　放，从中午开到下午6点，去年在股东会的那一个周末，我们缔造了历史最佳

　　的记录，业绩比前一个年度成长一倍，星期天的单日销售额打破历史记录，查理

　　臭屁的认为这完全要归功于当天他在现场接受大家用发票索取签名的缘故，当然

　　我对于这样的推论持保留态度，我不认为这是成功方程式中的重要因子，在去年

　　星期天短短8个小时的营业时间内，波仙总共开出了2,501张的发票，数学好

　　的人可以掐指一算，这约等于每11秒钟开出一张发票，不过请大家千万不要对

　　查理客气，务必让他签名签到手抽筋。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Shareholders who wish to avoid Sday's crowd can visit

　　Borsheim's on Saturday (10 a.m.-5:30 p.m.) or on Monday (10 a.m.-8

　　p.m.). Be sure to identify yourself as a Berkshire owner so that Susan

　　Jacques, Borsheim's CEO, can quote you a "shareholder-weekend" price.

　　Susan joined us in 1983 as a $4-per-hour salesperson and was made

　　CEO in 1994. This move ranks as one of my best managerial decisions.

　　怕挤的股东可以选择在星期六(早上10点到下午5点半)或星期一(早上10点到

　　下午8点)光临波仙珠宝，记得向波仙的总裁-Susan Jacques 表明你Berkshire

　　股东的身分，如此她才能够给各位股东周末的优惠价，Susan在1983年从每

　　小时时薪4美元的业务员做起，并在1994年成为公司的总裁，这项人事调整

　　事后证明是我一生中最佳的管理决策之一。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Bridge players can look forward to a thrill on Sunday, when Bo

　　Hamman -- the best the game has ever seen -- will turn up to play with

　　our shareholders in the mall outside of Borsheim's. Bob plays without

　　sorting his cards -- hey, maybe that's what's wrong with my game. We

　　will also have a couple of other tables at which another expert or two

　　will be playing.

　　桥牌爱好者请屏息以待，桥牌界的传奇性人物Bob Hamman将会在星期天下午

　　出席在波仙珠宝店外面大厅举办的一场桥牌大赛，Bob打牌从来不用整理排堆，

　　嘿嘿!或许这就是我为什么一直打不好的原因，当然现场还会有其它高手出现与

　　大家一起打牌。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Gorat's -- my favorite steakhouse -- will again be ope

　　especially for Berkshire shareholders on the Sunday night before the

　　meeting. Though Gorat's served from 4 p.m. until about 1 a.m. last year,

　　its crew was swamped, and some of our shareholders had an

　　uncomfortable wait. This year fewer reservations will be accepted, and

　　we ask that you don't come on Sunday without a reservation. In other

　　years, many of our shareholders have chosen to visit Gorat's on Friday,

　　Saturday or Monday. You can make reservations beginning on April 1

　　(but not before) by calling 402-551-3733. The cognoscenti will

　　continue to order rare T-bones with double orders of hash browns.

　　我个人最爱的牛排馆-Gorat's为了Berkshire股东年会破例在星期天开门营

　　业，虽然去年Gorat's牛排馆从下午四点开始营业，一直到半夜一点半，但是餐

　　厅还是被拥挤的人群给挤爆了，以致于让许多股东等候多时，今年我们将减少订

　　位人数，事先没有订位的人请勿前往以免向隅，当然股东也可选择在星期五、星

　　期六或星期一前往，该餐厅从四月一号后才开始接受预订(电话402-551-

　　3733)，识途的老马都知道要点丁骨\牛排加上双份的牛肉丸。

　　　 　 　 　 　The Omaha Golden Spikes (nee the Omaha Royals) will meet the

　　Iowa Cubs on Saturday evening, May 1st, at Rosenblatt Stadium. Your

　　Chairman, whose breaking ball had the crowd buzzing last year, will

　　again take the mound. This year I plan to introduce my "flutterball." It's a

　　real source of irritation to me that many view our annual meeting as a

　　financial event rather than the sports classic I consider it to be. Once the

　　world sees my flutterball, that misperception will be erased.

　　奥玛哈金钉鞋队(原奥玛哈皇家队)将于五月一日星期六晚上在Rosenblatt体育

　　馆对上爱荷华州的小熊队，去年本人技惊四座的变化球，将会再度出现在投手丘

　　上，不过今年我还预计祭出新练的上飘球，对于许多人将Berkshire股东会视为

　　投资金融界而非体育界的盛事，我感到相当的气愤，相信等到世人看过我的上飘

　　球后，应该就能导正大家这种错误的观念。

　　　 　 　 　 　 　Our proxy statement includes instructions about obtainin

　　tickets to the game and also a large quantity of other information that

　　should help you to enjoy your visit. I particularly urge the 60,000

　　shareholders that we gained through the Gen Re merger to join us.

　　Come and meet your fellow capitalists.

　　股东会资料将告诉大家如何取得球赛入场的门票，以及有关本次会议期间大量的

　　旅游信息，在此我也特别呼吁经由购并通用再保而新加入的60,000名股东，一

　　定要来见见其它资本主义的伙伴。

　　* * * * * * * * * * * *

　　　 　 　 　 　 　It wouldn't be right to close without a word about the 11.8 peopl

　　who work with me in Berkshire's corporate office. In addition to

　　handling the myriad of tax, regulatory and administrative matters that

　　come with owning dozens of businesses, this group efficiently and

　　cheerfully manages various special projects, some of which generate

　　hundreds of inquiries. Here's a sample of what went on in 1998:

　　在年报结束前，我一定要再感谢一下在Berkshire企业总部与我一起共事的11.8

　　位工作伙伴，除了平时要处理因为拥有数十家营利事业所衍生复杂难解的租税、

　　法令与行政事务之外，这个团队同时还非常有效率且热心地管理许多特别的专

　　案，包含了上千次的不厌其烦的回答，以下就是他们在1998年所做的一些工

　　作。

　　6,106 shareholders designated 3,880 charities to receive

　　contributions.

　　6,106位股东指定捐赠给3,880个慈善机关团体

　　Kelly Muchemore processed about 17,500 admission tickets for

　　the annual meeting, along with orders and checks for 3,200

　　baseball tickets.

　　Kelly Muchemore处理超过17,500件股东会出席证，外加3,200件棒

　　球赛的订单与支票

　　Kelly and Marc Hamburg produced and directed the Aksarben

　　extravaganza, a job that required them to arrange the

　　presentations made by our subsidiaries, prepare our movie, and

　　sometimes lend people a hand with travel and lodging.

　　Kelly与Marc Hamburg负责制作、导演整个阿肯萨本秀，包含安排各

　　个子公司所做的简报、准备短片，有时还要协助来宾解决交通与食宿的问

　　题

　　Debbie Bosanek satisfied the varying needs of the 46 media

　　organizations (13 of them non-U.S.) that covered the meeting,

　　and meanwhile, as always, skillfully assisted me in every aspect of

　　my job.

　　Debbie Bosanek满足了46家采访媒体机构各种不同的需求(其中还包

　　含13家外国媒体)，同时一如往常地协助我处理所有日常事务

　　Debbie and Marc assembled the data for our annual report and

　　oversaw the production and distribution of 165,000 copies. (This

　　year the number will be 325,000.)

　　Debbie及Marc负责整理股东会的报告并负责165,000份年报的制作与

　　发送(今年的份数将增加至325,000份)

　　Marc handled 95% of the details -- and much of the substance -

　　- connected with our completing two major mergers.

　　Marc负责处理95%以上的细节，同时更重要的是完成两件重大购并案的

　　后续处理工作

　　Kelly, Debbie and Deb Ray dealt efficiently with tens of thousands

　　of requests for annual reports and financial information that came

　　through the office.

　　Kelly、Debbie以及Deb Ray非常快速地处理成千上万要求寄发年报及

　　相关财务信息的回函

　　　 　 　 　 　 　You and I are paying for only 11.8 people, but we are gettin

　　what would at most places be the output of 100. To all of the 11.8, my

　　thanks.

　　虽然我们只支付11.8人份的薪水，但我们所得到的成果却相当于100位人力的

　　付出，对于这支11.8个人的团队，我衷心地致上个人的感谢之意。

　　March 1, 1999

　　Warren E. Buffett

　　Chairman of the Board

　　沃伦•巴菲特

　　董事会主席

　　1999年3月1日

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